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UNBUNDLING PROCEDURE: CARVE-OUTS FROM 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
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Abstract 
A rich literature analyzes how parties choose between courts and 
arbitration. Within this literature, scholars traditionally assume that 
sophisticated parties make a single choice between courts and arbitration 
based on the bundle of dispute resolution services that seems most 
appealing ex ante. As with the literature on bundling generally, however, 
legal scholars are increasingly focusing their attention on the unbundling of 
court and arbitral procedures―that is, the ability of parties to contract for à 
la carte or customized dispute resolution procedures in court and 
arbitration. While such unbundling is common ex post, i.e., after a dispute 
arises, most of the scholarly attention has focused on ex ante unbundling of 
procedures. Unfortunately, this burgeoning theoretical literature faces a 
difficult empirical reality: the available empirical evidence reveals 
surprisingly little use of customized procedural rules in contracts between 
sophisticated parties. Parties appear only rarely to agree to unbundle 
dispute resolution procedures ex ante. 
 This Article argues that ex ante procedural unbundling does occur, but 
through unbundling by claim and remedy rather than through à la carte 
choice of individual procedures. In a wide variety of contracts, parties 
routinely unbundle the procedures governing their anticipated disputes, 
deciding to pursue some claims and remedies in court and others in 
arbitration. By unbundling claims and remedies in this manner, parties can 
obtain greater performance incentives and lower dispute resolution costs 
without facing the prospect of prohibitively expensive specification costs. 
Claim and remedy unbundling, through contractual carve-outs and carve-
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ins, enables parties to separate governing procedures based on the nature of 
the specific risks of nonperformance. For most parties, less perfectly 
crafted off-the rack rules applied on the basis of carefully tailored claims 
appear preferable to more carefully tailored procedural rules that must then 
apply to all possible disputes. 
The prevalence of unbundling by carve-outs in contracts involving 
sophisticated parties has policy implications for courts’ treatment of 
unconscionability and nonarbitrability questions that arise in the context of 
enforcing arbitration clauses.  Moreover, to ensure that local courts provide 
value to commercial parties, governments should focus on the substantive 
rules and procedures applied to claims that function to protect information, 
innovation, reputation, and property. 
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Bundling, or the package sale of two or more goods or services, is 
“ubiquitous.”1 Consider, for example, gift baskets, cable service packages, 
and cars sold with standard options.2 This widespread bundling suggests 
that firms and customers both benefit from packaged products and 
services.3 At the same time, however, recent technological innovation and 
legal change have resulted in increasing unbundling of previously 
packaged products. Phone companies provide long distance calling plans 
separately from local phone service.4 Airlines charge separately for air 
travel and baggage handling.5 Music companies sell songs individually 
instead of in albums.6 Television programs are available à la carte.7 
Economists and others debate the implications of unbundling for 
consumers and society,8 but it is undisputed that unbundling is occurring. 
Like other sellers, courts and arbitration institutions provide bundles of 
services to their customers―in this case, bundles of dispute resolution 
procedures to the parties in a dispute. Courts provide the default bundle,9 
but parties can opt instead for arbitral procedural bundles that vary 
according to the applicable arbitration rules chosen by the parties.10 The 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating 
Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
707, 707–08 (2005). 
 2. For other examples, see id. at 708 n.2. 
 3. Bruce H. Kobayashi, Two Tales of Bundling: Implications for the Application of Antitrust 
Law to Bundled Discounts, in ANTITRUST POLICY AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 10, 10–12 (Robert W. 
Hahn ed., 2006). Kobayashi also describes potential price discrimination and anti-competitive uses 
of bundling. Id. at 14–22. 
 4. See Nicholas Economides et al., Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local Phone 
Service, 39 RAND J. ECON. 699, 699 (2008). 
 5. Hans O. Schumann & Harmeet Singh, The De-Bundling of U.S. Airline Bag Fees and 
Fares: An Exploratory Study, 13 J. ACAD. BUS. & ECON. 91, 91 (2013). 
 6. Anita Elberse, Bye-Bye Bundles: The Unbundling of Music in Digital Channels, 74 J. 
MARKETING 107, 107 (2010). 
 7. See Gregory S. Crawford & Ali Yurukoglu, The Welfare Effects of Bundling in 
Multichannel Television Markets, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 643, 682–83 (2012). 
 8. E.g., Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of 
Rights in Creative Works, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (2011) (analyzing the efficiency of contracts that 
unbundle the rights created by copyright law); Gad Allon et al., Would the Social Planner Let Bags 
Fly Free? (Aug. 30, 2011) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1919807 
(modeling reasons for unbundling air travel and baggage transportation); Marty Lariviere, Are 
Baggage Fees Good for Society?, THE OPERATIONS ROOM (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://operationsroom.wordpress.com/2011/08/31/are-baggage-fees-good-for-society/ (discussing 
Allon et al., supra). 
 9. See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1.5 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that 
“litigation is the default process of dispute resolution”). 
 10. For examples of off-the-rack procedural rules, see INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
ARBITRATION RULES (2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-
and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/Download-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-
Arbitration-in-several-languages/ [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2013), available at 
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choice between courts and arbitration depends on a number of factors. 
Courts provide government-appointed decision makers (i.e., judges), 
typically provide more discovery than arbitration, and include an appeals 
process.11 In contrast, arbitration provides party-selected decision makers 
(i.e., arbitrators), generally provides less discovery than court, often 
generates a more expedited final determination, and offers only a limited 
appeals process.12 Courts are open to the public (with exceptions) and 
subsidized by the government; arbitration is typically confidential and is 
paid for by the parties.13 Class actions may be available in court, but are 
unavailable in arbitration (at least when parties include a class arbitration 
waiver with their arbitration clause).14  
A rich collection of literature analyzes party choice between courts and 
arbitration.15 Within this literature, scholars traditionally assume that 
sophisticated parties make a single choice between courts and arbitration 
based on the bundle of dispute resolution services that seem most 
appealing ex ante.16 As with the literature on bundling generally, however, 
legal scholars are increasingly focusing their attention on the unbundling of 
court and arbitral procedures―that is, the ability of parties to contract for à 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103 [hereinafter AAA 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES]; JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 
(2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/. 
 11. See, e.g., Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 39, 42–44 (2006); see also Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A 
Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 287, 310–12 (2004) (discussing the advantages and risks of litigation). 
 12. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration, and 
the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 275, 300 (2009) (“A party including 
an arbitration clause in its contract is specifying a bundle of characteristics of the dispute resolution 
process.”); Obiajulu Charles Okuh, Reasons to Arbitrate Disputes Between Multinational 
Companies and Third-Country National Employees, DISP. RESOL. J. May/July 2011, at 64, 70–71 
 13. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1211, 1222–26 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements―with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 
251, 285 (2006). 
 14. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005). 
 15. For examples, see Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That is the Question, 8 
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 91 (1999); Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of 
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003); 
Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic 
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995); see also 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 70–90 (2009); CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 127–56 (1996); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do 
Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433 (2010).  
 16. See infra text accompanying note 29. 
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la carte or customized dispute resolution procedures in court and 
arbitration.17 While such unbundling is common ex post, i.e., after a 
dispute arises,18 most of the scholarly attention has focused on ex ante 
unbundling of procedures.19 Unfortunately, this burgeoning theoretical 
literature faces a difficult empirical reality: the available empirical 
evidence reveals surprisingly little use of customized procedural rules in 
contracts between sophisticated parties.20 Parties appear only rarely to 
agree to unbundle dispute resolution procedures ex ante. 
This Article argues that ex ante procedural unbundling does occur, but 
through unbundling by claim and remedy rather than through à la carte 
choice of individual procedures. Although procedural scholars have 
ignored claim and remedy unbundling, it plays a vital role in contractual 
customization of dispute resolution. Specifically, parties that agree to 
                                                                                                                     
 17. For examples, see Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through 
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for 
Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (2011); Jamie Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private 
Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation 
Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013); 
Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to 
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579 (2007); 
Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms Underlying Civil 
Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471 (2013); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private 
Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009); Robert E. Scott & George G. 
Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Elizabeth 
Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181. 
 18. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 17, at 495–96; Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 600 (2005). This Article focuses primarily on ex ante unbundling via the 
use of carve-outs from arbitration for two reasons. First, ex ante carve-outs are more easily and 
more reliably studied than are ex post carve-outs. Second, where drafting costs can be overcome, ex 
ante customization likely is more frequent than ex post customization, at least in the context of 
arbitration. As several scholars have noted, ex post, the parties’ interests likely diverge in ways that 
make agreement over large matters difficult. See, e.g., Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to 
Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 895–96 (2004); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” 
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 746–78; Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: 
The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 559, 567–68 (2001). Although this Article focuses on studies of ex ante 
customization, the possibility of limited ex post customization could cause parties to avoid the 
drafting costs of ex ante procedural customization, a topic that Part I briefly discusses. Finally, this 
Article focuses on carve-outs rather than carve-ins because carve-outs appear to be much more 
commonly incorporated into party agreements. In the contracts we studied, evidence of carve-ins 
was much more isolated. 
 19. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 18. 
 20. David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 429 (2014) 
(“There is precious little evidence that parties are routinely, or even rarely, attempting to tailor 
public procedure [i.e., procedures in court] to their own ends.”); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., 
Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 137 (2012) (“[D]espite the robust 
academic literature on the subject, real-world customization is largely absent, although we find 
some evidence that it is slowly increasing over time.”). 
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arbitration clauses commonly exclude (or carve out) certain claims or 
remedies from their arbitration clause,21 and parties that plan to take most 
disputes to court sometimes provide for arbitration to resolve particular 
matters. In separate studies, the authors found considerable evidence that 
these forms of customization are common. O’Hara O’Connor et al. found 
“strong evidence” of parties to CEO employment contracts “carving out 
certain types of litigable claims from otherwise broad agreements to 
arbitrate.”22 Likewise, Drahozal and Wittrock found that arbitration clauses 
in franchise agreements frequently contained carve-outs.23 Less commonly, 
according to the CEO employment data studied by O’Hara O’Connor, 
parties will agree to litigate future disputes as a matter of default but then 
agree to resolve certain specific disputes through arbitration. In these latter 
situations, the parties “carve in” particular matters to arbitration. 
Carve-outs and carve-ins are mechanisms by which parties choose 
between court and arbitral bundles of procedures on a claim-by-claim or 
remedy-by-remedy basis. By using carve-outs and carve-ins, parties can 
obtain a more carefully calibrated unbundling of procedure than an 
arbitration clause or forum-selection clause alone would provide, but at a 
much lower overall cost than the parties would incur by contracting for 
individual procedures. What often results is a sort of middle ground for 
bundling of procedural rules: parties choose among pre-set bundles of 
dispute resolution services, but unbundle the circumstances where any 
given dispute resolution bundle will be used. This phenomenon is common 
and widespread, observed with varying frequency across a number of 
different contracting contexts, and thus deserves more careful 
consideration. 
This Article theoretically and empirically analyzes procedural 
unbundling by use of carve-ins and carve-outs.24 Part I provides an 
informal model of decision-making regarding the choice between court and 
arbitral procedural bundles as well as the unbundling of those procedures 
by use of carve-outs and individualized customization. Under the model, 
choices regarding dispute resolution forum and possible unbundling are a 
function of performance incentives, dispute resolution costs, drafting (or 
specification) costs, and bifurcation costs resulting from the possibility that 
a dispute between the parties might need to be resolved in two different 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Even outside the context of customized procedure, carve-outs have received relatively 
little discussion in the academic literature. For exceptions, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual 
Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537, 552–55 (2002); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of 
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 97–99. 
 22. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 137. 
 23. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 113–15, 114 tbl.16 (2008). 
 24. Specifically, the Article treats the two phenomena theoretically, but reports on carve-outs 
only in the empirical analysis, due to the fact that carve-outs appeared much more frequently than 
did carve-ins in our studies. 
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forums. The model sheds light on why some, but not all, parties will opt 
for carve-outs or carve-ins, and why à la carte, customized procedure could 
prove too costly for most parties.  
Part II empirically analyzes procedural unbundling by carve-outs in 
several contractual settings, including CEO employment contracts, 
technology agreements, franchise contracts, joint-venture agreements, and 
cell phone service contracts. These different contractual settings enable a 
comparison of the use of carve-outs across varying types of relationships; 
in domestic, foreign, and cross-border contracts; and in sophisticated party 
and consumer settings.  
Part III explores several implications of procedural unbundling by 
carve-outs for future scholarship and public policy. First, carve-outs are a 
form of procedural unbundling that deserves greater emphasis in the 
literature on contractual procedure. When understood as procedural 
unbundling, carve-outs shed light on the plausibility of explanations for the 
dearth of other types of contractual customization.  
Second, in the literature on economic development, scholars disagree 
about the extent to which a nation seeking to maximize investment 
opportunities needs first-rate court systems with highly developed rule-of-
law principles when it could instead opt for the cheaper route of credibly 
committing to enforce arbitration clauses and awards. Our study of 
procedural unbundling by use of carve-outs suggests that arbitration is not 
always a perfect substitute for well functioning courts. Instead, the 
governing legal principles and court procedures are far more important for 
the resolution of some types of private disputes than others. This Article 
examines some more general implications as well. For example, it suggests 
that states look more closely at their rules governing specific performance 
as a remedy. 
Third, the common use of carve-outs by sophisticated parties provides 
important context for courts when reviewing the use of carve-outs in 
contracts with consumers and employees. Courts around the world are 
currently struggling with whether to enforce contract clauses that give only 
one party a right to seek relief in courts or in arbitration; this Article’s 
analysis provides helpful guidance for some of those cases. Courts often 
see carve-outs as strange contract terms that likely lack legitimate business 
justification, but this suspicion is unwarranted. Far from shocking the 
conscience, these provisions are common in contracts between 
sophisticated parties who are represented by lawyers. Such provisions are 
not inherently unfair exercises in nonmutuality; instead, at least in 
sophisticated party contracts, they are wealth-maximizing customizations 
that provide value to the parties.  
Finally, this Article’s analysis of procedural unbundling by carve-outs 
suggests that courts should be more willing to use severability doctrines to 
preserve the arbitration obligation for remaining claims, even when some 
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claims must proceed in court. Contrary to the assumptions used by most 
courts, sophisticated parties readily contract for proceedings bifurcated 
between arbitration and court. Accordingly, when a court invalidates 
certain provisions in an arbitration clause as unconscionable, it should 
preserve the remainder of the arbitration clause for claims as to which the 
arbitral procedural bundle is not unconscionable. Our analysis suggests that 
courts currently may be too willing to strike the entire arbitration 
provision. Likewise, this analysis supports the conclusion that when 
Congress or a court decides that a federal right is not appropriately 
vindicated in arbitration, the limitation should extend only to the 
problematic claim, rather than striking the entire arbitration clause, as 
sometimes happens. Part III uses treatment of arbitration clauses under the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act25 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act26 as examples.  
I.  CONTRACTING FOR PROCEDURE 
This Part provides a simple, informal model of dispute resolution 
choices to illustrate the tradeoff between differing types of procedural 
bundles.27 Section I.A considers the situation where ex ante parties make a 
binary choice between courts and arbitration for the resolution of future 
disputes. Section I.B discusses parties that consider the possibility of 
unbundling procedure by claim or remedy―that is, by using carve-outs 
from or carve-ins to arbitration. Section I.C returns to the binary choice 
between courts and arbitration and instead considers the possibility that 
parties unbundle procedure by individually customizing the procedures that 
would apply to resolve their disputes. Section I.C models party decision-
making as the existing literature on procedural customization assumes it 
occurs. Of course, claim and remedy customization and other procedural 
customization are by no means mutually exclusive.28 Nevertheless, the 
framework in this Part provides a mechanism for thinking about the 
tradeoffs involved in the parties’ choices. 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012)). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 
(2012)). 
 27. The model developed in this Article starts with Professor Keith Hylton’s framework for 
choosing between courts and arbitration. See Hylton, supra note 15, at 223–26. Like other scholars, 
Professor Hylton conceived of the parties’ choice as binary, without considering the ways parties 
can choose to unbundle procedures. Id. at 223. Because unbundling by claim and remedy consists 
of a series of choices between courts and arbitration, Professor Hylton’s framework provides solid 
foundation for this Article’s general approach. This Article therefore borrows from and extends 
upon his analysis. 
 28. Of course, other contractual choices are possible. For example, parties could opt to 
attempt to resolve their disputes through mediation. Because mediation does not bind the parties, 
however, it is different in kind from, and can be used in conjunction with, both arbitration and 
courts. This Article, therefore, does not discuss contracting for mediation. 
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A.  Dispute Resolution as Binary Choice of Forum 
Scholars analyzing the contractual choice between litigation and 
arbitration have traditionally treated the decision as a binary one,29 as 
reflected in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1—Binary Choice of Forum: Arbitration or Litigation 
Many scholars have analyzed this choice as a straightforward 
determination based on the relative dispute resolution costs of arbitration 
and litigation, where “costs” are construed broadly to include dollars spent, 
time, convenience, etc. However, Professor Keith Hylton famously pointed 
out that the method of dispute resolution can provide “deterrence benefits” 
that should also be taken into account in any cost-benefit calculation.30 For 
Professor Hylton, deterrence benefits are the social benefits associated with 
having a potential defendant take care to avoid harm to the other party, and 
the defendant’s incentive to take care can vary based on the liability he 
expects to face, which can in turn depend on the dispute resolution forum 
chosen by the parties.31 We adapt his conceptual analysis by focusing on 
“performance incentives” in lieu of deterrence benefits. Specifically, the 
choice between litigation and arbitration can influence the extent to which 
parties comply with their contractual obligations, both because it can affect 
the feasibility of vindication as well as the accuracy of liability 
determinations. An assessment of the relative virtues of choosing the 
forum should include those considerations.32  
Consider, for example, two features of the arbitral bundle of procedures 
that might reduce the costs to the parties of arbitrating their claims relative 
to litigation: (1) the ability to choose expert decision makers; and (2) 
                                                                                                                     
 29. E.g., Hylton, supra note 15, at 223; Richard R.W. Brooks & Sarath Sanga, Commercial 
Arbitration Agreements Between Sophisticated Parties: An Empirical View 5 (Feb. 24, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Brooks 
Sanga2013.pdf. 
 30. Hylton, supra note 15, at 213. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 261. 
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limited discovery options available to the parties. Although each of these 
features of arbitration can reduce the cost of proceeding to arbitration, they 
can differentially affect the parties’ incentives to behave well under the 
contract. Expert decision makers can decrease the likelihood of an 
erroneous decision, which would have the effect of incentivizing 
contractual performance.33 In contrast, limited discovery might hamper a 
plaintiff’s ability to establish her claims, which could increase the 
likelihood of an erroneous decision relative to litigation, and therefore 
decrease performance incentives.34 When making a binary determination 
between courts and arbitration, parties must weigh the overall cost 
considerations together with the overall effect that the procedures will have 
on the likelihood that the parties will perform as carefully as promised. 
In Figure 1, parties will choose arbitration over litigation if the net 
benefits to arbitration exceed the net benefits to litigation, taking all 
possible claims and disputes into account. The net benefits of arbitration 
include the performance incentives from arbitration minus the costs of 
proceeding to arbitration. Similarly, the net benefits of litigation include 
the performance incentives from litigation minus the costs of proceeding 
with litigation. Specifically, if one assumes that the defendant’s failure to 
perform as promised can increase the probability (and perhaps the 
magnitude) of harm suffered by the plaintiff, then the performance 
incentives associated with defendant’s care include the marginal decrease 
in expected harm to the plaintiff minus the cost to the defendant of taking 
those performance precautions.35  
The various features of arbitration and litigation can influence the 
probability that the defendant will perform as promised. In Figure 1, the 
forum choice is binary so that the net effect on this probability is 
determined in the aggregate. As a result, expected performance incentives 
are equal to the probability the defendant will perform, given the dispute 
resolution forum chosen, multiplied by the net benefits of performing. 
Expected dispute resolution costs are simply the sum of the expected costs 
to each party of resolving their disputes in a particular forum. If the parties’ 
forum decision is binary, then the parties will choose to arbitrate rather 
than litigate their claims when the performance incentives from arbitration 
minus the costs of arbitrating exceed the performance incentives of 
litigating in court minus the costs of litigating.36 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 751. 
 34. See id. at 752. 
 35. Thus, if: LL = expected harm to the potential plaintiff when the defendant does not take 
precautions to ensure performance,; Ls = expected harm to the potential plaintiff when the 
defendant does take precautions, and X = cost of precautions to the defendant, then, the expected 
performance incentives associated with the defendant taking precautions are equal to: LL – Ls – X. 
 36. Stated otherwise, denoting P as the probability the defendant will take care, if expected 
performance incentives for a particular forum equal P (LL – Ls – X) and expected dispute resolution 
costs to plaintiff and defendant equal ECP + ECD, the parties will agree to arbitration when: 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/3
2014] UNBUNDLING PROCEDURE 1955 
 
Again adapting Professor Hylton’s analysis,37 parties will decide to 
arbitrate whenever the joint benefits of arbitration exceed its joint costs. 
However, that conclusion only holds in a world without transaction costs. 
In reality, the parties that opt for arbitration incur costs of negotiating and 
then drafting arbitration clauses. This Article removes the assumption of 
zero transaction costs.38 In particular, parties who opt for litigation need 
not include any provisions in their contracts,39 but parties opting for 
arbitration must specify that preference and then ideally further specify 
information about their preference (or not) for an arbitration provider, an 
arbitration venue, governing rules, etc. 40 These costs are labeled the 
“specification costs” of drafting a generalized arbitration clause.41 
Specification costs also include the possibility that individuals are 
boundedly rational and therefore strongly prefer not to make decisions 
along many dimensions.42 Thus, still assuming a binary choice, parties 
would choose to arbitrate rather than litigate their future disputes if the 
performance incentives to arbitrating minus the expected arbitration costs, 
minus the cost of contract specification exceed the performance incentives 
of litigation minus expected litigation costs.43 
B.  Dispute Resolution with Procedures Unbundled by Claim or 
Remedy (i.e., with Carve-Outs and Carve-Ins) 
                                                                                                                     
Equation 1: Pa(LLa – LSa – Xa) – [ECPa + ECDa] > Pc(LLc – LSc – Xc) – 
[ECPc + ECDc]. 
 37. Hylton, supra note 15, at 263 (concluding that parties will arbitrate when the social 
benefits exceed the social costs). 
 38. Professor Hylton also considers that parties do not pay the full cost of the court system 
(court systems are heavily subsidized by tax revenues). Thus, when parties opt for court resolution 
of their claims, they do not actually internalize the costs of using court personnel. See id. at 213. For 
simplicity, this Article ignores the potential problem of assuming that courts are costless here, but it 
will consider this defect when analyzing the policy implications of the analysis in Part III. 
 39. However, if parties wish to agree to litigation in a particular forum, then litigation would 
have specification costs as well. 
 40. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING (3d ed. 2010) (discussing possible provisions to include in 
arbitration agreements); PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 2007) (same). 
 41. The specification costs here may at times offset savings in specification costs elsewhere in 
the contract. Thus, arbitration by an expert decision maker might enable the parties to avoid 
specifying performance duties (although it could also increase other specification costs due to the 
fact that the focus on dispute resolution makes the parties rethink other contract terms). For 
simplicity, we hold the other contract specification costs constant in order to focus on these ignored 
but important costs of choosing arbitration. 
 42. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A 
Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2006).  
 43. Or when: 
 Equation 2: Pa(LLa – LSa – Xa) – [ECPa + ECDa] – SC(arb)P,D > Pc(LLc – 
LSc – Xc) – [ECPc + ECDc] 
where SC(arb)P,D represents the specification costs incurred by the parties. 
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In reality, however, the choice between litigation and arbitration is not 
binary; in many contractual settings parties choose the litigation bundle of 
procedures for most claims but reserve the right to take particular claims or 
determinations to arbitration. Alternatively, parties who have chosen an 
arbitral bundle of procedures for most of their claims regularly reserve a 
right to litigate certain claims, obtain certain remedies in court, or both. 
This Article refers to these more specific decisions as carve-ins in the first 
case, and carve-outs in the second case. As modelled, this decision-making 
process is two-staged. The first stage entails the decision about whether the 
parties generally wish to resolve disputes in court or arbitration. The 
second stage addresses whether to carve in or carve out exceptions. Thus, 
the parties’ decisions are represented by the matrix presented in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2—Decision Matrix with Claim/Remedy Specific 
Determinations 
As indicated above, Professor Hylton’s analysis assumes that parties 
must make an all-or-nothing choice between arbitration and litigation.44 
Under his analysis, the parties will choose the socially optimal result after 
taking into account the overall costs and benefits of choosing courts versus 
arbitration.45 But with such binary decision-making, it remains entirely 
possible that the parties have chosen a suboptimal method of resolving 
particular types of claims or disputes under the contract. If parties are able 
to unbundle the applicable procedures by claim or remedy, they may be 
able to construct a dispute resolution clause that makes them better off than 
an all-or-nothing choice of litigation or arbitration. In other words, this 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 45. Hylton, supra note 15, at 223–25. 
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analysis removes the assumption that the parties’ decisions are binary. 
Figure 2 depicts the decision process of the parties.46 At the first 
decision node in Figure 2, the parties must choose whether to start with the 
background assumption that they will generally arbitrate or litigate their 
claims. Borrowing the analysis from Section I.A above, parties would 
choose a default rule of arbitration rather than litigation if, for a majority of 
claims, the performance incentives to arbitrating minus the expected 
arbitration costs minus the cost of contract specification exceed the 
performance incentives of litigation minus expected litigation costs. This 
decision reflects the parties’ judgment about the best procedure for 
resolving a majority of the parties’ disputes, even if a subset of the claims 
would be better resolved by other procedures. 
Once the parties choose arbitration or litigation for most disputes, they 
face a second decision regarding whether to carve-out or carve-in particular 
claims or remedies for separate treatment. Unbundling procedures by 
claims and remedies enables the parties to choose dispute resolution 
mechanisms that further maximize their joint benefits. Consider, for 
example, the situation in which parties find themselves at decision node A 
in Figure 2. Although these parties will have chosen to arbitrate most 
claims, they might reserve a right to litigate a subset of possible claims. As 
explained further below, parties might prefer the court bundle of 
procedures in a number of circumstances, particularly when the primary 
form of relief sought is injunctive relief (including preliminary injunctions 
and other provisional remedies), when the merits of the case are likely 
clear, and when the parties perceive the stakes of a possible dispute as very 
high.47   
Conversely, parties located at decision node B in Figure 2 have chosen 
to litigate the bulk of their claims, yet some might be better resolved using 
the arbitral bundle of procedures. For example, industry experts might be 
better situated to make certain factual determinations, such as calculating a 
bonus provision or other valuation or making substantial performance 
determinations.48 Parties also might prefer arbitration to litigation in 
circumstances where cross-border enforcement is contemplated.49 
Relatively small claims also might be more viable in arbitration, where 
formalized procedures can be relaxed and attorney representation might be 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Figure 2 might not accurately represent the decision-making process of all parties in that 
the decision regarding the treatment of particular claims may be part and parcel of the parties’ 
background choice to use the courts or arbitration. In particular, for some parties, arbitration is 
made appealing only after some claims are set aside for courts. This Article treats the two decisions 
separately here in order to promote ease of analysis, but nothing turns on the particular presentation. 
 47. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 453–57. 
 48. See Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of 
Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CINN. L. REV. 127, 170 (2013) (“Earnout provisions … 
tend to require that disputes be brought to private arbitration rather than through the courts.”). 
 49. E.g., BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 15, at 136. 
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unnecessary.50 
The question of carve-outs (decision node A) involves an initial 
determination to utilize arbitration as a matter of default. Parties will 
incorporate carve-outs into their agreement when the net benefits to 
litigation exceed the net benefits to arbitration for that matter. However, 
the parties incur the drafting costs of including carve-outs when they opt 
for litigation rather than arbitration to treat some individual claims. The 
drafting costs of specifying litigation of a claim or remedy include the costs 
of negotiating for court resolution of that claim or remedy and the cost of 
drafting a relevant clause (which could, but need not, include a provision 
specifying the court where such claim or relief would be sought).  
This more fine-tuned calibration could entail significant costs. With 
carve-outs, the parties must contemplate specific types of future disputes 
and even potential issues that might arise in the course of those disputes. 
Then they must carefully describe (in a way that prevents courts from 
intruding into the wrong disputes or becoming involved in line drawing) 
which disputes fall into the carve-out provision. In addition to these 
additional drafting costs, parties who choose to carve-out some claims for 
litigation might incur “bifurcation costs,” which are the costs of having a 
party’s dispute divided between two forums because that dispute involves 
multiple claims, only some of which fall within the agreement to 
arbitrate.51 Practitioners cite these drafting and bifurcation costs as reasons 
not to carve out claims from an arbitration clause52 (indeed, the widespread 
                                                                                                                     
 50. E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“[Permitting 
businesses to avoid a pre-dispute arbitration clause might] leav[e] the typical consumer who has 
only a small damages claim . . . without any remedy but a court remedy, the costs and delays of 
which could eat up the value of an eventual small recovery.”); see also Theodore Eisenberg & 
Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 
DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 45 (finding evidence that “lower-paid employees seem 
to lack ready access to court”). 
 51. Whenever parties choose to arbitrate claims, they risk incurring a second type of 
bifurcation cost, whereby they must proceed in court to determine some matters, including whether 
the arbitration clause is enforceable and whether the courts should provide preliminary relief. Then 
they proceed to arbitration to resolve the underlying claim, at which point they might need to turn 
back to the courts to enforce the arbitration award. Arbitration law minimizes these bifurcation costs 
by severely limiting the role of courts in scrutinizing arbitration agreements and awards. 
Nevertheless, these costs exist, and they are likely more significant in cases where parties seek 
temporary or permanent injunctive relief. Part II further explores this second type of bifurcation 
cost, but this Article leaves it out of the textual analysis here so as not to unduly confuse the reader. 
 52. E.g., 1 BORN, supra note 15, at 1128 (“The enforceability of [carve-outs for payment 
obligations] is not subject to serious doubts. In general, however, sophisticated advisers counsel 
against this approach. The jurisdictional and other uncertainties that result from such a bifurcated 
dispute resolution scheme usually outweigh any potential benefits.”); Kenneth Mathieu & Vincent 
P. (Trace) Schmeltz III, Dispute Resolution as a Part of Your Merger or Your Acquisition 
Agreement, 1 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 61, 74 (2012) (noting that narrow 
provisions lead to ancillary litigation, namely, about whether the parties “have or have not delegated 
an issue to the arbitrator”). 
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presence of carve-outs has come as a surprise to some practitioners with 
whom the authors have spoken). 
Thus, informed decision makers at node A will include carve-outs in an 
agreement only if the net benefits to arbitrating the claims (performance 
incentives of arbitration minus expected arbitration costs) are less than the 
net benefits of litigating the claims (performance incentives of litigation 
minus expected litigation costs minus the specification costs of including 
carve-outs minus expected bifurcation costs).53 Otherwise, the parties will 
choose the no-carve-out option. 
Informed parties at decision node B have decided to retain the default 
court bundle of procedures for resolving most claims, and they face the 
question of whether to carve in some of their claims or issues for 
determination in arbitration. In this case, carving in entails specification 
costs, including both the costs of choosing (or not) an arbitral forum, 
governing rules, etc., but also involves the costs of carefully specifying 
which claims ultimately should be arbitrated. In addition, the decision to 
use carve-ins can entail bifurcation costs.54 To justify a carve-in, arbitration 
of the particular matter must add performance incentives or decrease 
dispute resolution costs relative to litigation, and those advantages must be 
large enough to offset the accompanying specification and bifurcation 
costs. Conversely, to justify a carve-out, litigation of the particular matter 
must add performance incentives or decrease dispute resolution costs 
relative to arbitration, and those advantages need to be large enough to 
offset the accompanying specification and bifurcation costs.  
Stated otherwise, carve-outs and carve-ins enable parties to unbundle 
dispute resolution procedures where it is efficient to do so. To illustrate: 
According to the arbitration literature (and practitioner surveys), parties 
often seek arbitration as a low-cost mechanism for resolving disputes.55 To 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Or when: 
Equation 3: Pa(carve-out)(LLa – LSa – Xa) – [EC(carve-out)Pa + EC(carve-
out)Da] < Pc(carve-out)(LLc – LSc – Xc) – [EC(carve-out)Pc + EC(carve-
out)Dc] – SC(carve-out)P,D – [EBC(carve-out)P + EBC(carve-out)D] 
where SC(carve-out)P,D represents the specification costs of carving out claims or relief and 
[EBC(carve-out)P + EBC(carve-out)D] represents the expected bifurcation costs to each party of 
possibly having to proceed in two different forums in the event of dispute.  
 54. Thus, we can expect parties to use carve-ins only when: 
Equation 4: Pa(carve-in)(LLa – LSa – Xa) – [EC(carve-in)Pa + EC(carve-
in)Da] – SC(carve-in)P,D – [EBC(carve-in)P + EBC(carve-in)D] > Pc(carve-
in)(LLc – LSc – Xc) – [EC(carve-in)Pc + EC(carve-in)Dc] 
 55. E.g., DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 4, 9–10 (2011), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf 
(surveying 121 corporate counsel and finding that most believe that arbitration saves money when 
compared with litigation). For a summary of other relevant surveys, see Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 
826–29 (2008). 
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ensure that arbitration is cheap, however, there can be an inevitable 
tradeoff between cost and accuracy.56 Parties generally preferring a low-
cost arbitration forum (and rules) might instead opt for a more expensive 
forum to ensure that they can obtain a high-quality determination when 
accuracy really matters. The carve-out enables the parties to get the benefit 
of low-cost arbitration and use courts when the added costs are justified.  
The opposite can be true as well. Sophisticated international parties 
might opt for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration, which 
is expensive but very high quality (higher than for most courts),57 but carve 
out some claims for court resolution when the higher costs of arbitration 
are unjustified. In each case, the parties are better off than they would be if 
they compromised by choosing mid-level cost and accuracy for all of their 
claims. Sometimes parties can achieve this tailoring without carve-outs or 
carve-ins by, for example, choosing an arbitral forum that offers both types 
of dispute resolution and allowing the forum (or the parties after the fact) 
to choose the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism. But carve-ins and 
carve-outs are justified when the parties are unlikely to agree ex post and 
the arbitration provider’s decision cannot be trusted (incentive 
incompatible) or when other potential benefits are obtainable with carve-
outs or carve-ins. If parties opt for high-end or low-end arbitration, then 
this analysis would predict a higher incidence of claim carve-outs, all else 
being equal. 
Carve-ins and carve-outs can serve an additional function not reflected 
in the analysis provided above. Specifically, they can help the parties 
address uncertainty regarding the appropriate treatment of cases within a 
particular claim category. The analysis above assumed that, on net, 
particular types of claims are better suited for arbitration or courts. 
Although it might generally be possible to make such conclusions for 
claims categories, parties might face considerable uncertainty regarding the 
appropriate treatment of individual claims within a category. Thus, for 
example, broad discovery rights might not be important for most disputes 
within a given category of high-value claims, but accurate resolution of 
some disputes might turn on the ability to use broad discovery. In that 
situation, a party might want the option to proceed to court for those cases 
even though for other potential cases the costs of litigating the claims 
(bifurcated proceedings plus additional dispute resolution costs) would be 
unjustified.58 
Consider also the situation where the value of some claims in a 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 752–53. 
 57. See ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 10. 
 58. Patrick Bolton and Antoine Faure-Grimaud developed a model showing that when it is 
too costly to think through remote contingencies ex ante, boundedly rational parties might agree to 
provide one party with options as control rights which can be exercised ex post. See Patrick Bolton 
& Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Satisficing Contracts, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 937, 938 (2010). 
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category cannot be known unless the plaintiff has a right to broad 
discovery without incurring high up-front costs.59 Here too, the party might 
value the option of bringing some claims to court, where filing fees are 
lower. In these cases, retaining the litigation option can significantly 
influence performance incentives because it helps to ensure that 
meritorious cases are in fact brought. Consistent with this analysis, carve-
outs and carve-ins can be (and often are) drafted to provide one of the 
parties with the option, rather than a duty, to proceed in court (or 
arbitration) for the specified category of matters. Having the option in the 
face of uncertainty—i.e., where potential suits within a claim category are 
heterogeneous—enables the parties to further maximize the joint benefits 
of dispute resolution decisions.  
C.  Dispute Resolution as a Binary Forum Choice with à la Carte 
Procedures 
Now consider procedural unbundling by use of customized or à la carte 
procedures. Parties make a binary choice between court and arbitration, but 
they can customize the specific procedures applied by the forum. As in 
Section I.B, this Section models the parties’ choice as a two-stage decision. 
In stage 1, parties choose the forum. In stage 2, the parties decide whether 
to customize the procedures. In reality, the customization choice could 
conceivably influence the forum choice, but here the assumption is that the 
parties will pick the forum that comes closest to their preferred procedures 
and then decide whether it is worth the additional effort necessary to 
further tailor the procedures to their needs. Figure 3 represents the parties’ 
decision matrix: 
                                                                                                                     
 59. In a model presented by Huang and Grundfest, variance in the expected value of a lawsuit 
can induce litigation even in “negative-value” suit contexts because cheap discovery provides 
plaintiffs with more information about the actual value of their lawsuit, which could in fact turn out 
to have positive-value. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 42, at 1276–77, 1287–88. 
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Figure 3—Decision Matrix with Customized Procedure Determinations 
The stage 1 decision—the choice between decision nodes C and D—
entails the costs and benefits described in Section I.A. Specifically, the 
parties will choose arbitration as their forum if, and only if, the 
performance incentives to arbitration minus the expected costs of 
arbitration, minus the specification costs of arbitration (without 
customization) exceed the performance incentives to court resolution 
minus the expected costs of proceeding in court. Costs and benefits here 
are calculated by aggregating the costs and benefits across contract risks 
and their accompanying claims.  
Once the parties initially decide whether to arbitrate or litigate, they 
then decide whether to customize the procedures. Parties that choose 
arbitration, located at node C, must decide whether to customize the 
arbitration procedures. Here, the model assumes that the parties have 
chosen an arbitration provider and an off-the-rack set of rules offered by 
the provider. The question the parties then face is whether to customize the 
default procedures (represented by their choices of forum and governing 
rules) along one or more dimensions. Parties would choose to customize 
the arbitration procedures where the added performance incentives to 
customized arbitration minus the incremental costs of the customized 
arbitration exceed the specification costs associated with the 
customization.60 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Or when: 
Equation 5: Pa(customize)(LLa – LSa – Xa) – [EC(customize)Pa + 
EC(customize)Da] > SC(customize)P,D. 
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For many potential customizations, this condition is unlikely to hold. 
Consider first the marginal benefit of customization for the parties. 
Without customization, the parties have chosen an arbitration provider that 
generally operates according to its needs (or at least comes closer than 
other available options) and off-the-rack rules that further align the parties’ 
preferences with the proceedings. Any specific customization can improve 
on these off-the-rack rules administered by the chosen provider. Because 
the parties have already chosen the set of default rules that best suit their 
needs, presumably, the benefits of customization will only be marginal. 
Moreover, that customization will apply to all of the parties’ claims, and 
for many customizations, the net benefits can operate in opposite directions 
across claims. For example, a customization requiring that the arbitrator be 
an industry expert will lower the cost of some claims (substituting away 
from the need to engage in costly proof exercises) and provide greater 
accuracy (and therefore greater performance incentives). For other claims, 
however, accurate resolution will not require that the arbitrator be an 
industry expert. In those cases, the expert does not add to performance 
incentives and could actually increase the cost of dispute resolution, 
assuming that experts charge more than nonexperts and that there is no 
reduction in party effort to prove the claim.  
More generally, because off-the-rack rules tend to provide arbitrators 
with considerable discretion,61 customization can inhibit the flexibility of 
the arbitrator. Limiting the arbitrator’s flexibility can be problematic if that 
flexibility would otherwise enable her to apply optimal procedures to each 
claim.62 Consider, for example, customization of the parties’ rights to 
discovery or the presentation of evidence in the event of a dispute. Narrow 
discovery rights and evidence rules tend to enable the parties to conserve 
dispute resolution costs at the expense of accuracy, while broader 
discovery rights and evidence rules increase the cost of dispute resolution 
but can increase accuracy.63 Without ex ante specification, arbitrators 
might find some leeway in the governing procedural rules to at least 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Professor William Park has lamented the broad procedural discretion given to arbitrators, 
calling for more specific rules to cabin their discretion. William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields 
Lecture—Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. 
INT’L 279, 283 (2003). The absence of much, if any, movement in that direction supports the 
contrary view stated here. 
 62. Note that the conclusion here is the converse of that found in the literature on economic 
development, where scholars promote rules rather than standards for use in developing national 
courts in order to check judicial corruption and incompetence. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei 
Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 
PAPERS & PROC. 398, 400 (1998). Here, party control over the choice of arbitrator should generally 
protect against corruption and incompetence, although in cases where parties use arbitration for 
cheap and quick conflict resolution (e.g., eBay disputes), less discretion might be preferred. 
 63. See Drahozal, supra note 18, at 752–53. 
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partially tailor discovery and evidence to the type of claim at issue.64 If so, 
the arbitrator could use that discretion to ensure that the marginal benefit of 
increased accuracy for the dispute justified the additional dispute resolution 
costs. No doubt arbitrators can make errors in judging which available 
procedures maximize performance incentives at the lowest cost. Parties 
nervous about such errors might want to specify procedures to reduce those 
errors. Ex ante, however, those errors may appear less costly than the 
parties’ rigid imposition of a procedural rule to be applied to the resolution 
of all future disputes. 
The specification costs of customization are likely to be large relative to 
the net benefits. The costs of physically drafting a customization are likely 
insignificant, especially for high-value contracts. However, the cost of 
anticipating the universe of possible disputes and ensuring that the 
customization provides a net benefit to the parties could be quite 
significant.65 Errors deprive the arbitrator of a flexible application of 
available procedures. Contrast these specification costs to those present in 
the context of carve-outs and carve-ins. With carve-outs, the parties decide 
that, although they generally prefer to resolve their disputes with 
arbitration, for one or more claims they prefer an option to proceed in 
courts. With carve-ins, the parties decide to use courts with the exception 
of one or more claims. In each context, the exceptions work to increase the 
expected welfare of the parties because the parties believe that a particular 
risk should be treated in a different way. Presumably, the parties can 
realize that increased welfare without having to consider the universe of 
possible claims or contexts where disputes might arise. A specific claim or 
form of remedy can be separated out for particularized negotiation and 
treatment. In general, then, this analysis would predict the specification 
costs of customizing specific procedural rules to be greater than the 
specification costs of including carve-outs or carve-ins. 
Parties that choose courts, located at node D, must also decide whether 
                                                                                                                     
 64. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INT’L CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION: INT’L 
ARBITRATION RULES art. 20.1 (2014), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/ 
groups/international/documents/document/z2uy/mdiw/~edisp/adrstage2020422.pdf (“Subject to 
these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers 
appropriate . . . .”); ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 10, art. 22(2) (“In order to ensure effective 
case management, the arbitral tribunal, after consulting the parties, may adopt such procedural 
measures as it considers appropriate, provided that they are not contrary to any agreement of the 
parties.”); JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, supra note 10, R. 17(b) 
(“Absent agreement, the Arbitrator shall determine [deposition] issues including whether to grant a 
request for additional depositions, based upon the reasonable need for the requested information, 
the availability of other discovery, and the burdensomeness of the request on the opposing Parties 
and witness.”). 
 65. See Park, supra note 61, at 296 (“[S]pecific rules might cause some lawyers to counsel 
against arbitration, from fear of losing their margin to manoeuvre once the dispute arises. Prior to 
the arbitration, parties do not necessarily know what rules will benefit them on matters such as 
discovery and punitive damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
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to customize the procedures applied in court. Similar to the decision faced 
by parties at node C, these parties should customize when the net 
performance incentives to customization minus any cost increase are 
greater than the specification costs of customization.66 The costs and 
benefits here are presumably similar to those faced by the parties at node C 
with three possible differences. First, the parties may be less confident that 
a judge will have procedural discretion or will use it in beneficial ways. 
Thus, the hampering of performance incentives to customization is likely 
smaller. Second, the cost savings to customization could be larger because, 
unlike arbitration providers, courts are not developing menus of off-the-
rack rules that pretend to suit parties well.67 Third, the parties might think 
that they are limited in the extent to which they can customize their 
procedures.68 Parties might think that they can get away with customizing 
one or two features of court dispute resolution but limit their provisions out 
of a fear that judges would balk at numerous specifications that change the 
judge’s perceived role. If so, then the performance incentives and cost 
savings might be limited, with the specification costs still high. But 
generally, although parties have relatively little incentive to specialize 
procedures in courts or arbitration, it is not clearly the case that the parties’ 
incentives are lower when they opt for court resolution of their disputes. 
In summary, relative to untailored, all-or-nothing, forum-selection 
clauses, procedural unbundling through customized procedural rules 
promises greater performance incentives and lower process costs, but 
applying those customized procedures to all possible disputes can entail 
much higher specification costs. Moreover, customized procedural rules 
can hamper the decision maker’s flexibility in ways that actually reduce 
performance incentives. Arbitration clauses that opt for carve-outs rather 
than customization can be used to obtain greater performance incentives 
and lower process costs than all-or-nothing forum-selection rules, but they 
introduce increased specification costs and bifurcation costs. Relative to 
customized procedural rules, carve-outs could impose higher dispute-
resolution costs, but the effect on performance incentives is uncertain. At 
the same time, carve-outs create bifurcation costs, but their ability to align 
customizations with differing risks suggests that their specification costs 
would be much lower.69 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Or when: 
Equation 6: Pc(customize)(LLc – LSc – Xc) – [EC(customize)Pc + 
EC(customize)Dc] > SC(customize). 
 67. Of course, business courts might provide an exception here, but the point is that 
arbitration providers typically engage in more menu development than do courts. 
 68. See Bone, supra note 17, at 1351 (“For without formal assurance of legal enforcement [of 
party procedural rulemaking], parties would have trouble making credible commitments.”). 
 69. As noted above, supra note 18, this Article focuses on ex ante rather than ex post 
procedural unbundling. As such, the models presented here simplify reality by assuming away the 
possibility of ex post customization. To the extent parties can agree to ex post customization at low 
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Ultimately, the relative costs and benefits of these differing choices of 
procedural bundles is an empirical question, as is the possibility that the 
parties could choose some of each type of bundling to resolve disputes. As 
discussed above, the existing empirical studies find little evidence of 
unbundling through detailed customization of procedures in contracts 
between sophisticated parties.70 The next Part examines the extent to which 
parties contract for procedural unbundling by claim or remedy with carve-
outs. 
II.  UNBUNDLING PROCEDURE BY CLAIM AND REMEDY:  
DATA AND FINDINGS  
This Part examines empirically the use of procedural unbundling by 
carve-outs in a wide range of contracts, including CEO employment 
contracts; domestic, foreign, and cross-border agreements entered into by 
technology firms; domestic and international joint venture agreements; 
franchise agreements; and mobile wireless service contracts.71 At least 
three of these categories of contracts involve two sophisticated parties with 
substantial bargaining power.72 In addition, two of the categories enable a 
comparison of contracting behavior between U.S. firms and others, 
particularly those located in China. A comparison across contract types and 
industries provides a glimpse of the circumstances where carve-outs seem 
most useful.  
The contracts studied here nevertheless create inevitable selection bias 
in that we purposefully focus on contracts where arbitration clauses are 
commonly used. It has not yet been possible to study these arbitration 
clauses in many contractual settings. Moreover, many (although not all) of 
the contracts were obtained through the SEC’s EDGAR database, which 
contains only those contracts considered of “high value” to the firm.73 
Although the findings here can therefore provide only tentative conclusions 
about party use of carve-outs, much can be said, at least initially, about 
their incidence and functions. The central findings of the studies are as 
follows: 
 
                                                                                                                     
cost, it would reduce their incentive to agree to ex ante customization as well as, possibly, their 
incentive to use carve outs. Ultimately, how parties respond to the various alternatives is an 
empirical question, and this Article’s findings suggest that they frequently agree to use carve-outs. 
 70. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 71. The Article focuses here on carve-outs rather than carve-ins because the use of carve-outs 
is much more common, facilitating our empirical analysis. Of course, the apparent rarity of carve-
ins itself is a relevant data point. 
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 74–108. 
 73. For example, the contracts collected from SEC filings are limited to contracts “material” 
to the corporation and likely do not include many contracts from business’s day-to-day operations. 
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 458–59. 
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1.  Carve-out rates vary across the contracts studied. Carve-
outs are present in essentially all franchise contract arbitration 
clauses, nearly two-thirds of domestic and cross-border 
technology contract arbitration clauses, and about one-half of 
domestic joint venture agreement arbitration clauses and CEO 
employment contract arbitration clauses. With one exception 
noted in conclusion five, carve-outs are included in relatively 
few international and foreign agreements. Specific types of 
carve-outs are present with varying rates across industries and 
contract type. This suggests that parties take into account the 
relative costs and benefits of using such carve-outs. 
2.  Carve-outs are used more often for claims where the 
parties will seek primarily property-type protections, or 
injunctive relief. The carve-outs suggest that injunctive relief 
is more valuable to the parties when it is backed by state 
force. Court resolution of these matters likely provides 
significantly higher performance incentives. Parties could, 
and often do, simply carve out a right to go to court for 
preliminary injunctive relief, permanent injunctive relief, or 
both. But in many cases, parties carve out the whole claim for 
court resolution. This suggests that parties seek potential cost 
savings associated with having a court decide the whole 
matter. Otherwise, the parties must go to court seeking 
preliminary relief, return to the arbitrator for resolution of the 
merits of the claim, and then back to court for permanent 
injunctive relief. Apparently, some parties forecast that the 
cost savings of carving out the claim entirely is greater than 
the possible bifurcation costs associated with having some 
claims resolved in court while others are resolved in 
arbitration. 
3.  Carve-outs are broadly used as a tool to protect the value 
of information, innovation, and reputation. Using courts to 
protect information seems counterintuitive at first, because 
one commonly suggested virtue of arbitration is its ability to 
enable the parties to maintain confidentiality. However, as 
explained below, information is often best protected with 
injunctive relief, a remedy that courts are more effective at 
providing. To the extent technological advances suggest that 
contracts derive larger fractions of their value from 
information and innovation over time, one can forecast an 
increasing reliance on the use of carve-outs. 
4.  Carve-outs are used in circumstances where it is plausible 
that the parties value in rem or other determinations that could 
affect the rights of third parties to the litigation (i.e. claims 
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regarding patent validity, the use of confidential information, 
and the ability to hire another firm’s employees). Because 
arbitration can only settle the rights of the parties litigating a 
particular matter, there may be increased performance 
incentives and decreased overall dispute resolution costs to 
having such actions settled in courts. 
5.  For those types of contracts where protection of 
information and innovation seem more important to the 
contract’s value (i.e., franchise and technology contracts), 
carve-outs are more prevalent. This is true even in the case of 
cross-border contracts, where the enhanced cross-border 
enforceability of arbitration awards should deter parties from 
using courts to resolve any claims. 
6.  In the cases of protection of information, innovation, 
reputation, and property, the carve-outs often seem to benefit 
one party to the agreement. If that party has substantial 
bargaining power in the drafting of the contract, carve-outs 
will appear at very high rates. For example, carve-outs are 
found in almost all franchise contracts where the franchisor 
commonly has more bargaining power. Where bargaining 
power is more equal, carve-outs are still common but appear 
somewhat less frequently, as is the case for domestic joint 
venture agreements and CEO employment contracts. The fact 
that carve-outs are still found in half of the latter arbitration 
clauses suggests that the increased performance incentives of 
the carve-outs can create mutual benefits to parties. However, 
the increased specification costs (including negotiation) and 
bifurcation costs must be shared jointly and could work to 
hinder the presence of carve-outs somewhat. 
7.  Parties also sometimes carve out small claims and claims 
for moneys owed, suggesting a motivation to reduce dispute 
resolution costs. For example, arbitration can be more 
expensive than litigation for debt collection cases because of 
the need to confirm an arbitration award in court before 
creditors’ remedies can be used.  
8.  In general, U.S. contracting parties use carve-outs more 
often than parties located in other countries. This could be a 
function of the U.S. lawyer culture, or it could be a byproduct 
of parties in other countries being less certain of the reliability 
of their own court systems.  
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9.  Parties can only benefit from carve-outs when (a) they trust 
courts to better protect their interests than arbitrators; and (b) 
courts will enforce the arbitration clauses with the carve-outs. 
The technology contracts and international joint venture 
agreements studied provide powerful evidence that the first 
requirement is not satisfied for parties located in China. 
Carve-outs are almost never found in these contracts. In 
addition, the CEO employment contracts provide evidence 
that California courts’ failure to satisfy the second 
requirement hinders the ability of contracting parties in that 
state to reap the benefits of carve-outs in employment 
contracts. In short, this form of wealth enhancement requires 
well-functioning and cooperative courts. 
A.  CEO Employment Contracts 
In a follow up to a 2010 article,74 O’Hara O’Connor, Martin, and 
Thomas analyzed a sample of CEO employment contracts for companies 
included in the S&P 1500 during 1995–2005.75 The authors coded 910 
initial and restated contracts76 filed by those companies with the SEC and 
available on LiveEdgar.77 They then coded the contracts for the presence of 
a number of provisions contained within different arbitration clauses.78 The 
parties agreed to arbitrate all of their disputes (though perhaps with carve-
outs) in 458 of these contracts. The parties agreed to arbitrate only some of 
their disputes (“carve-ins”) in 5 of the contracts, and provided options to 
arbitrate in another 6 of the contracts. Of the 910 contracts studied, 469 
contracts (51.5%) included an arbitration provision.79 
Of the arbitration clauses in the sample, 219 (47%) included one or 
more carve-outs―that is, specific provisions within the arbitration section 
of the agreement that listed one or more exceptions to, or exclusions from, 
the arbitration agreement.80 Table 1 lists the carve-outs found in the 
arbitration clauses and the frequency with which they were present: 
                                                                                                                     
 74.  See Randall Thomas et al., Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 977–82 (2010). 
 75. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 158. 
 76. Id. at 159. Restated contracts are those that are drafted after amendment or renewal with 
the intention of replacing the parties’ initial contract. Id. 
 77. See id. at 158–60 (describing the contract collection and coding methodology).The study 
started with 1,970 CEO employment contracts, but many took the form of contract amendments, 
which were eliminated from the sample once it became clear that the amendments were short, 
tended to address only one or two matters, and tended not to address dispute resolution. Id. at 158–
59. 
 78. Id. at 159–60. 
 79. Id. at 160. For a full description of the details of the arbitration clauses in these contracts, 
see generally O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 162–77. 
 80. Id. at 168. 
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Table 1. Carve-Outs in CEO Employment Contracts 
Type of carve-out # of contracts with carve-out 
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Any carve-out 219 47% 
Noncompete clause claims 144 32% 
Confidentiality clause claims 166 37% 
Client nonsolicitation clause 
claims 99 22% 
Employee nonsolicitation 
clause claims 137 30% 
Nondisparagement clause 
claims 30 7% 
Preliminary relief carve-out 56 12% 
 
A noncompete clause carve-out was present in a contract that included: 
(1) a noncompete clause, which is a clause under which the CEO agrees 
not to work for a competitor or to open a business that competes with the 
company for some period of time after the CEO’s employment terminates; 
(2) an arbitration clause; and (3) a clause providing that, notwithstanding 
the arbitration clause, claims based on the noncompete clause could be 
heard in courts. A confidentiality clause carve-out was present in 
agreements where: (1) the CEO promised to keep certain information 
pertaining to the company and its activities private;81 (2) the parties agreed 
to arbitrate their disputes; and (3) the parties nevertheless reserved the right 
to bring confidentiality clause claims to court. Client nonsolicitation and 
employee nonsolicitation clauses contained promises by the CEO not to 
solicit clients or employees of the company for a certain period of time 
after leaving the firm. A nondisparagement clause contained a promise by 
the CEO not to make public comments disparaging the firm during or after 
termination of the employment relationship. Finally, the preliminary relief 
carve-out provided a statement that, notwithstanding the arbitration clause, 
a party can go to court to seek preliminary relief (such as a preliminary 
injunction). The preliminary relief carve-out may differ from the other 
types of carve-outs in the sense that these carve-outs may be inserted in aid 
of arbitration rather than as a statement that the parties desire courts instead 
of arbitration. But regardless of the motive for the carve-out, all carve-outs 
can tell us something about the circumstances in which contracting parties 
demand court services. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Importantly, these confidentiality clauses are not provisions stating that the parties agree 
to keep details about their future disputes private. Some of the arbitration clauses in CEO 
employment contracts did include those provisions, but they are not counted here. 
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The carve-out rates listed above are somewhat imperfect indicators of 
party preferences for carve-outs, however. Specifically, it is not always 
apparent from the data what fraction of the contracts containing both a 
particular type of clause and an agreement to arbitrate also state that 
disputes arising under the clause will be carved out for court resolution. 
For example, in the entire sample of CEO employment contracts, only 
thirty contained nondisparagement clause carve-outs. That seems like a 
small number of carve-outs, but it could be that relatively few contracts 
contain nondisparagement clauses in the first place. Unfortunately, O’Hara 
O’Connor, Martin, and Thomas did not code the data for the presence of 
all of these clauses, though they did code for the presence of confidentiality 
clauses and nonsolicitation clauses.82 A total of 418 of the contracts calling 
for arbitration also contained a confidentiality clause. Recall that 166 of 
these contracts carve out disputes involving a breach of that clause. Thus, 
39.7% of the contracts with both confidentiality clauses and arbitration 
clauses carve-out these disputes for courts.83 O’Hara O’Connor, Martin, 
and Thomas also coded the data for the presence of a nonsolicitation clause 
(these clauses could prohibit the solicitation of either employees or 
clients).84 A total of 345 contracts with an arbitration clause contained such 
a contract, and 145 of those contracts carved out claims under either the 
employee or the client nonsolicitation provisions. Thus, 42% of the 
contracts with a nonsolicitation clause and an arbitration agreement carved 
out those issues for court resolution.85 
Note that these companies are carving out disputes involving clauses 
that help the company protect the value of its private information. This 
information helps give the company a competitive advantage, primarily 
through enhanced trademark and effective trade secrets. One advantage of 
arbitration is that it provides the parties with enhanced confidentiality 
because, unlike court proceedings, the arbitral proceedings are not a matter 
of public record.86 When the underlying dispute is about the CEO diluting 
the value of the company’s information, however, the parties may need to 
resort to courts to protect the information’s value. Arbitrators have the 
authority to order injunctive relief,87 but without the contempt power of the 
courts, an arbitrator’s order may prove ineffective. Moreover, preliminary 
injunctions may be a necessary adjunct to such a proceeding, and 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 169. 
 83. Id. at 168–69. 
 84. Id. at 169. 
 85. Id. 
 86. E.g., Schmitz, supra note 13, at 1222–26. 
 87. E.g., 2 BORN, supra note 15, at 2480–81; see also, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 10, R-47(a) (“The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator 
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties . . . .”); id. R-37(a) 
(“The arbitrator may take whatever interim measures he or she deems necessary, including 
injunctive relief . . . .”). 
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arbitration is not well suited to award such emergency relief.88 Both 
arbitrators and courts can award damages for breach of an agreement. 
Valuing information is difficult, however, and proof problems and limited 
CEO assets can hinder effective compensation. In these circumstances, the 
parties seem to prefer courts to arbitration because they prefer more 
reliable recourse to equitable relief. 
Finally, the data showed both a statistically significant increase in the 
use of arbitration clauses over time and a statistically significant increase in 
the use of carve-outs over time. In addition, the average number of carve-
outs found in an arbitration clause increased during the time period 
studied.89 
B.  Technology Contracts 
Technology-related contracts provided a second type of contract from 
which to study carve-outs from arbitration. We gathered and coded 
contracts available on EDGAR that were filed with the SEC between July 
2007 and July 2011. The authors searched the filings of companies 
classified by four-digit SIC codes (and company names) that indicated the 
filing company’s classification as an IT-related business. Seven SIC codes 
were selected, which produced contracts from companies in radiotelephone 
communications (including wireless operators), telephone communications 
(including names like AT&T), data processing services, computer 
programming services, computer integrated systems design, computer 
processing and data services, and business services “not elsewhere 
classified” (including companies such as Yahoo!, eBay, and Zillow). 
Company filings were searched for “service agreement” and “commercial 
agreement.” Obviously, non-IT documents were then filtered out (i.e. share 
purchase agreements, credit agreements, financial reports, shareholder 
proxy agreements, and leases). This left 141 contracts that took the form of 
service agreements, master service agreements, licensing agreements, and 
other similar agreements. Several contracts were essentially duplicate 
contracts where the same company had entered into the same agreement 
with multiple parties. Where the terms looked substantially similar, the 
sample excluded duplicates. After this filtering, a total of 120 contracts 
were coded for the analysis. 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 456–57. Note that the study did not code as 
provisional relief carve-outs arbitration clauses incorporating provider rules stating that pursuing 
provisional relief in court is not a waiver of the right to arbitrate. E.g., AAA COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 10, R-52(a). Such rules differ from carve-outs because they do not 
exclude the arbitrators from jurisdiction over the matter. 
 89. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 175. Interestingly, contracts involving firms 
headquartered in California had significantly fewer carve-outs per arbitration clause than did firms 
located elsewhere, id., which likely stems from California courts’ hostility to the use of carve-outs 
in employment contracts. 
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The coded contracts represented firms listed in all seven SIC code 
categories.90 Although all contracts were filed between 2007 and 2011, 
they were executed between 1998 and 2011. However, the vast majority 
(90%) were executed between 2005 and 2011, and approximately 72% 
were entered into between 2007 and 2010. 
A total of fifty-seven, or 47.5%, of the 120 technology contracts 
analyzed contained an arbitration clause. This rate was similar to the CEO 
employment contracts (51.5%) discussed above.91 The technology 
contracts contained comparatively fewer carve-out provisions, however. In 
total, twenty (35.1%) of the contracts with arbitration clauses carved out 
some actions or forms of relief for court resolution, as compared with 47% 
of CEO employment contracts and 97.7% of franchise contracts.92 
Technology contract provisions carved out the types of claims shown in 
Table 2. The two most common types of carve-outs were for claims for 
injunctive relief (33.3% of arbitration clauses) and claims for breach of a 
confidentiality clause (17.5% of arbitration clauses). 
 
Table 2. Carve-Outs in Technology Contracts
Type of carve-out # of contracts with 
carve-out 
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Any carve-out 20 35.1% 
Injunctive relief claims 19 33.3% 
Confidentiality clause claims 10 17.5% 
Claims for monies owed 3 5.3% 
Noncompete clause claims 1 1.8% 
Nonsolicitation clause claims 1 1.8% 
 
The rate of incorporation of both arbitration clauses and carve-outs in 
the technology contracts varied by type of firm, as shown in Table 3. These 
rates also varied by the type of contract, as shown in Table 4. The variance, 
                                                                                                                     
 90. The frequency of the types of firms in the sample is as follows: 
 
SIC Number Category # of contracts 
4812 Radiotelephone Communications 10 
4813 Other Telephone Communications 21 
7370 Computer Programming/Consulting 14 
7371 Computer Programming Services 5 
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 4 
7374 Computer & Data Processing 15 
7389 Business Services (NEC) 51 
 TOTAL 120 
 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
 92. See supra Sections II.A., D. 
29
Drahozal and O'Connor: Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs From Arbitration Clauses
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1974 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
especially the large variance across contract type, suggests possible 
differences in party bargaining power. The variance also suggests 
differences in the relative value of information, innovation, or other assets 
for which injunctive relief might be necessary, as well as possible 
differences in the portfolio of risks each type of contract entailed. More 
generally, these differences would reflect differences in performance 
incentives, dispute resolution costs, specification costs, bifurcation costs, 
or some combination thereof. 
 
Table 3. Carve-Outs in Technology Contracts―By Type of Firm 
SIC category % contracts with 
arbitration 
clauses
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Radiotelephone communications 60.0% 33.3% 
Other telephone communications 43.0% 44.4% 
Computer programming/consulting 35.7% 40.0% 
Computer programming services 40.0% 50.0% 
Computer integrated systems design
 
50.0% 50.0% 
Computer & data processing 53.3% 25.0% 
Business services (NEC) 49.0% 36.0% 
 
Table 4. Carve-Outs in Technology Contracts―By Type of Contract 
Contract Type # of contracts % of contracts 
with arbitration 
clauses
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-outs 
Master Services 22 36.4% 75.0% 
Service Agreements 36 44.4% 25.0% 
Consulting 
Agreements 8 87.5% 0.0%93 
Licensing 
Agreements 8 62.5% 60.0% 
Communication 
Contracts 14 28.6% 25.0% 
General Business 
Operations 19 47.4% 44.4% 
Importantly, the technology contracts provide an opportunity to observe 
the contracting behavior of parties outside of the United States as well as 
those contracting across national borders. Before filtering out contracts 
without arbitration clauses, the authors categorized each contract into one 
                                                                                                                     
 93. All of the consulting agreement contracts were executed between two companies located 
in China. None of the contracts entered into between two Chinese companies had any carve-outs.  
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of three groups:94 contracts between two U.S. parties; contracts between 
two non-American parties from the same country; and contracts between 
companies located in two different countries (cross-border contracts). Most 
of the contracts involving two companies from the same country other than 
the United States were contracts between two companies located in China. 
Of the forty-three contracts in this category, thirty-six were executed by 
companies from China, two were executed by companies located in 
Vietnam, two by companies located in Mexico, one by companies located 
in the UK, one by companies located in Brazil, and one by companies 
located in Taiwan. Of the twenty-one cross-border contracts, sixteen of 
them involved a contracting party located in the United States. 
Table 5 reports on the incorporation of arbitration clauses and carve-
outs from arbitration in the contracts for each of the three party location 
categories: 
 
Table 5. Arbitration Clauses and Carve-Outs in Technology Contracts―By 
Nationality of Parties
 




foreign country Cross-border 
% of contracts 
with arbitration 
clauses 35.7% 65.1% 42.9% 
% of arbitration 
clause with carve-
outs 65% 3.6% 66.7% 
 
All but two of the “same country-foreign” contracts with arbitration 
clauses involved two companies located in China. The remaining two were 
contracts between parties located in Mexico and Brazil. The contract 
between two Mexican companies was the only contract in that group to 
carve anything out from arbitration. That contract contained a single carve-
out for confidentiality-clause claims. Of the nine cross-border contracts 
with arbitration clauses, seven of the nine involved a contract with one 
                                                                                                                     
 94. The frequency of each of the groups in the sample is as follows: 
 
Location of Parties # contracts % of total technology contracts 
Both companies U.S. 56 46.7% 
Both companies located in 
same country—non-U.S. 43 35.8% 
Companies located in two 
different countries (cross-
border) 21 17.5% 
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party located in the United States. The other two contained no carve-out 
clauses. Of the seven contracts involving one U.S. party, six (85.7%) had 
carve-outs. 
Arbitration clauses in technology contracts entered into between two 
U.S. parties and between one U.S. party and a party from another country 
included carve-outs for disputes as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Carve-Outs in Technology Contracts―By Nationality of Parties 
Type of carve-out # of contracts with 
carve-outs 
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Contracts between two  
U.S. parties
  
Any carve-out 13 65% 
Injunctive relief claims 13 65% 
Confidentiality clause claims 5 25% 
Nonsolicitation clause claims 2 10% 
Claims for monies owed 2 10% 
Contracts with one U.S. Party  
Any carve-out 6 85.7% 
Injunctive relief claims 6 85.7% 
Confidentiality clause claims 4 57.1% 
Claims to protect trademark 3 42.9% 
Noncompete clause claims 1 14.3% 
Claims for monies 1 14.3% 
 
Surprisingly, in the contracts with two U.S. parties, the parties did not 
seem interested in specifically carving out disputes involving intellectual 
property claims, although the confidentiality and nonsolicitation clauses 
can help a company protect trade secrets. In this sense, they more closely 
resembled the CEO employment contracts than the franchise agreements. 
In addition, these parties were more likely to rely on preliminary relief and 
less likely to carve out the entire claim than was the case for CEO 
employment contracts. The authors lack an intuition for this difference 
beyond the possibility that the technology industry firms are relatively 
more concentrated in California, where, as discussed below, carving out 
claims can jeopardize the enforceability of the entire arbitration clause. 
With the arbitration clauses in cross-border technology contracts, there 
is a small-sample problem preventing any firm conclusions. But note that 
the cross-border agreements were more likely to contain claims carve-outs 
as well as carve-outs specifically addressing the protection of intellectual 
property. One possibility for this difference, assuming it is a real one, is 
that parties do not worry about California courts’ treatment of carve-outs in 
the context of international arbitration. In general, although California 
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courts often insist on imposing rules for arbitration that tend to hinder 
domestic arbitration, the rules are relaxed in the international context,95 
presumably in an effort to compete for international arbitration business. 
Note that the presence of carve-outs in technology contracts varied 
dramatically according to the location of the parties. When the contract 
involved one or more parties located in the United States, carve-outs from 
arbitration were commonly present. Carve-outs in technology contracts 
involving a U.S. business occurred more frequently than they occurred in 
CEO employment contracts and less frequently than they occurred in 
franchise contracts.96 When two parties located outside of the United States 
entered into technology contracts, regardless of whether those companies 
were located in the same country, only a single carve-out was present in a 
single contract. However, 86.7% (twenty-six of thirty) of the contracts 
involving foreign parties and containing arbitration clauses were contracts 
between two companies located in China.  
The contracts with Chinese companies are instructive. Despite 
significant investment by the Chinese government in the development of 
intellectual property and other courts, the contracts indicated that parties 
remain reluctant to rely on such courts to resolve their claims. The findings 
serve as a reminder that court resolution of a claim can only add 
performance incentives if parties perceive the courts to be well 
functioning.97 As discussed below in Part III, this finding suggests that it is 
particularly important for courts in the United States and elsewhere to 
develop useful rules, precedents, and procedures to be applied to claims 
involving the protection of information, innovation, and reputation.98 
These claims are less well handled via arbitration than are other 
commercial matters, so the value added by courts likely is higher. 
Not surprisingly, the rate of the use of arbitration clauses is higher for 
cross-border contracts than for contracts entered into between two U.S. 
parties.99 Note, however, that the incidence of carve-outs in contracts that 
                                                                                                                     
 95. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.351 (West 2014) (In international commercial 
conciliation “[t]he parties may appear in person or be represented or assisted by any person of their 
choice. A person assisting or representing a party need not be a member of the legal profession or 
licensed to practice law in California”). 
 96. See supra Sections II.A., D. 
 97. Of course, a remaining puzzle is why Chinese contracting parties do not instead opt for 
foreign courts. This reluctance might well stem from concerns that Chinese courts will not enforce 
foreign court judgments. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in 
China From a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 758 (2004) 
(noting “notorious” difficulty of securing enforcement of foreign judgments in China). 
 98. See infra text accompanying notes 166–67. 
 99. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 351 tbl. 3 (2007) (finding double the rate of arbitration clauses in 
transnational corporate transaction contracts than in domestic ones); see also 1 BORN, supra note 
15, at 71. 
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had arbitration clauses was about the same in these two categories. This 
result is surprising given that court judgments are more difficult to enforce 
across borders than are arbitration awards.100 Presumably the parties 
perceive that the performance incentives to court resolution of the matters 
are so much higher than arbitration that they offset both the reduced 
performance incentives and the increased dispute resolution costs 
associated with potential cross-border enforcement difficulties.  
Finally, the rate of the use of arbitration clauses is highest for contracts 
entered into by two parties from the same country outside of the United 
States. Yet, in these cases the rate of carve-outs is dramatically lower. This 
suggests that, at least for foreign companies using the U.S. markets to raise 
capital, trust in the reliability of their domestic courts is significantly lower 
than it is for U.S. companies. 
C.  Joint Venture Agreements 
We also examined the use of carve-outs in a small sample of joint 
venture agreements, both international and domestic, collected from SEC 
filings in 2008.101 Of the twenty-one domestic joint venture agreements in 
the sample, nine (42.9%) included arbitration clauses and one (4.8%) 
included an arbitration clause applicable only to some issues (a “carve-
in”).102 Of the thirty-one international joint venture agreements in the 
sample, twenty-two (71.0%) included arbitration clauses.103 
As shown in Table 7, almost half (four of nine, or 44.4%) of the 
domestic joint venture agreements with arbitration clauses included a 
carve-out: three of nine (33.3%) permitted a party to go to court to seek 
provisional relief, and one of nine (11.1%) permitted a party to go to court 
to seek injunctive relief. As with the technology contracts discussed above, 
fewer of the international joint venture agreements with arbitration clauses 
(four of twenty,104 or 20.0%) included carve-outs: two of twenty (10.0%) 
contained carve-outs for injunctive relief; one of twenty (5.0%) included a 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 15, at 136. 
 101. The contracts previously were discussed in Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 465–66. 
 102. Joint Venture Agreement Between Myohionow.com, LLC and Lakes Ohio Development, 
LLC ¶ 7.3 (Apr. 29, 2008) (copy on file with author) (providing that if any provision of agreement 
is declared invalid, the parties are unable to negotiate a substitute provision, and a party “considers 
on reasonable grounds that its commercial interests . . . are materially and adversely affected,” then 
“it may submit such matter to arbitration pursuant [to] rules set forth by the American Arbitration 
Association”). 
 103. The thirty-one international joint ventures consisted of thirteen joint ventures with no 
U.S. parties, fourteen with a U.S. party and at least one non-U.S. party, and four with missing 
information about party nationality but with the location of the venture itself outside the United 
States. 
 104. The text of the dispute resolution clause for two of the international joint venture 
agreements was redacted from the SEC filing. In both cases the clause was an arbitration clause, but 
in neither case was it possible to tell whether the clause included any carve-outs. 
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carve-out for claims seeking provisional relief; and one of twenty (5.0%) 
carved out claims seeking to protect joint venture intellectual property 
rights or trade secrets as well as trade secrets or corporate opportunities of 
one (but not the other) of the parties in a joint venture105 
 
Table 7. Carve-Outs in Domestic and International Joint Venture 
Agreements
Type of carve-out # of contracts with 
carve-out 
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Domestic Agreements  
Any carve-out 4 44.4% 
Provisional relief claims 3 33.3% 
Injunctive relief claims 1 11.1% 
International Agreements  
Any carve-out 4 20.0% 
Provisional relief claims 1 5.0% 
Injunctive relief claims 2 10.0% 
IP, trade secrets, corp.               
opportunities 1 5.0% 
 
Carve-outs are less common in international joint ventures involving at 
least one Chinese party, but the sample is not large enough for any sort of 
statistical testing. All thirteen of the contracts with at least one party from 
China included arbitration clauses, but only one of those (7.7%) used a 
carve-out. By comparison, three of the remaining nine (33.3%) 
international contracts with arbitration clauses but without Chinese parties 
used carve-outs.106 
D.  Franchise Agreements 
Consider also the use of carve-outs in franchise agreements. Franchise 
agreements differ from the contracts discussed in the sections above in 
several respects. First, franchise agreements are not individually 
negotiated. The franchise agreements studied were standard form contracts 
drafted by the franchisor.107 Second, the sophistication of franchisees may 
vary widely. Some franchisees are inexperienced individuals running their 
first business. Other franchisees are large, publicly traded corporations.108 
To examine the use of carve-outs this study used two different samples 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Joint Venture Agreement Between Tambala Food Products and Millennium Group 
Worldwide ¶ 14.2.2 (Nov. 12, 2007) (copy on file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/containers/fix300/1409327/000112178108000092/millenniumexhibit10four.htm. 
 106. Six of these contracts had at least one U.S. party; two of those six used a carve-out. 
 107. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 722–23, 723 n.209. 
 108. Id. at 766. 
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of franchise agreements, both based on Entrepreneur Magazine’s Franchise 
500―an annual listing of top-ranked franchise opportunities.109 The 2011 
sample was derived from the top 100 franchises in 2011. The 1999 sample 
was derived from the top seventy-five franchise opportunities in 1999, and 
it tracked changes in the terms of those franchise agreements over time.110 
For both samples, we gathered contracts for those franchises operating in 
the state of Minnesota. Any franchisor that grants a franchise right within 
Minnesota must file a copy of the company’s standard franchise agreement 
with that state.111  
The 2011 sample consisted of eighty-six franchise contracts filed as of 
July 2011.112 Forty-three of the eighty-six contracts contained arbitration 
clauses (50%), and of those forty-three, all but one carved out one or more 
claims or proceedings from arbitration and provided a right to the parties to 
instead proceed in court. Below is a list of types of carve-out provisions 
found in the 2011 sample: 
 
Table 8. Carve-Outs in Franchise Agreements, 2011
Type of carve-out
# of contracts 
with carve-out
% of arbitration 
clauses with 
carve-out 
Any carve-out 42 97.7% 
Injunctive relief claims 41 95.3% 
Claims to protect trademark 29 67.4% 
Noncompete clause claims 17 39.5% 
Confidentiality clause claims 13 30.2% 
Nonsolicitation clause claims 8 18.6% 
Claims to protect real property rights 5 11.6% 
Claims for moneys owed 5 11.6% 
Non-disparagement clause claims 2 4.6% 
 
Most of these carve-outs were also found in the CEO employment 
contracts.113 Carve-outs to protect real property rights were found in 
franchise contracts where the franchisor agreed to lease commercial 
                                                                                                                     
 109. 2011 Franchise 500 Rankings, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
franchises/rankings/franchise500-115608/2011,-1.html (last visited June 24, 2014). 
 110. This sample is an updated version of one previously used in Drahozal, supra note 18, at 
722–24; see also Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 15, at 562; Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 23, at 
90. 
 111. These contracts are made available by the Minnesota Department of Commerce. See 
Commerce Action and Regulatory Documents Search, MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/security/search.do (last visited June 24, 2014). 
 112. The samples overlap to some degree: Of the eighty-six franchises in the 2011 sample, 
thirty-two also appear in the 1999 sample. 
 113. See supra Section II.A. 
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property from the owner and then sublease it to the franchisee to conduct 
franchise operations. Under the sublease arrangement, the franchisor 
reserved the right to enforce its rights to possession of the property in 
court.114 Carve-outs to collect monies owed simply provided that the 
franchisor could go to court to collect debts owed by the franchisee. 
The 1999 sample consisted of sixty-seven franchises for which 
franchise agreements were available for all of the years studied: 1999, 
2007, and 2013.115 The overall use of carve-outs is broadly consistent with 
the findings from the 2011 sample. Every franchise agreement with an 
arbitration clause, with the exception of one in 1999, included some form 
of carve-out. The relative frequency of the carve-outs was almost identical 
to the 2011 sample. 
 
Table 9. Carve-Outs in Franchise Agreements, 1999-2013
 # (%) of contracts with carve-out
 1999 2007 2013 
Any carve-out 30 of 31 
(96.8%)
29 of 29 
(100.0%)




29 of 31 
(93.5%)
28 of 29 
(96.6%)
27 of 31 
(81.7%) 
Claims to protect 
trademark116
21 of 31 
(67.7%)
20 of 29 
(69.9%)




17 of 31 
(54.8%)
17 of 29 
(58.6%)




8 of 31 
(25.8%)
12 of 29 
(41.4%)




5 of 31 
(16.1%)
11 of 29 
(37.9%)
13 of 31 
(41.9%) 
                                                                                                                     
 114. For example, see Supercuts, Subway, Circle K, Snap Fitness, and Fantastic Sam’s 
agreements (contracts on file with authors).  
 115. The original 1999 sample consisted of seventy-five franchises. Since then, seven of those 
franchises have either stopped doing business in Minnesota or stopped doing business altogether 
(through a merger or otherwise). 
 116. Consistent with the 2011 sample, franchise agreements in the 1999 sample were coded as 
including an injunctive relief carve-out whenever the arbitration clause carved out some form of 
injunctive relief, including preliminary injunctions and injunctive relief as to a particular type of 
claim. In addition, three arbitration clauses included language providing that injunctive relief was 
available under the usual standards for granting such relief, without specifically mentioning the 
forum. Again, consistent with the 2011 sample, these arbitration clauses were coded as including 
injunctive relief carve-outs. For both these reasons, the results reported here differ from the results 
reported in Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 23, at 114–15. 
 117. Two arbitration clauses included language providing that preliminary injunctive relief was 
available under the usual standards for granting such relief, without specifically mentioning the 
forum. Again, consistent with the coding of the clauses for injunctive relief carve-outs, see supra 
note 116, these clauses were also coded as including carve-outs for provisional relief claims. 
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Claims to protect real 
property rights 
9 of 31 
(29.0%)
6 of 29 
(20.7%)
3 of 31 
(9.7%) 
Claims for moneys 
owed 
12 of 31 
(38.7%)
9 of 29 
(31.0%)
10 of 31 
(32.3.0%) 
 
The franchise agreements in the 1999 sample provided two additional 
insights. First, for franchisors, carve-outs are not a new phenomenon. They 
were widespread in the franchise agreements from 1999. Second, the use of 
some carve-outs has changed, albeit only slightly, over time. Limiting the 
sample to franchise agreements that used arbitration agreements 
throughout the period illustrates this change. 
 
Table 10. Carve-Outs in Franchise Agreements, 1999-2013 (sample limited 
to franchise agreements that used arbitration clauses in every year) 
 # (%) of contracts with carve-out 
 1999 2007 2013 
Injunctive relief 
claims118 
22 of 23 
(95.7%)
22 of 23 
(95.7%)
21 of 23 
(91.3%) 
Claims to protect 
trademark
15 of 23 
(65.2%)
17 of 23 
(73.9%)




13 of 23 
(56.5%)
13 of 23 
(56.5%)




8 of 23 
(34.8%)
11 of 23 
(47.8%)




5 of 23 
(21.7%)
10 of 23 
(43.5%)
10 of 23 
(43.5%) 
Claims to protect real 
property rights 
6 of 23 
(26.1%)
5 of 23 
(21.7%)
3 of 23 
(13.0%) 
Claims for moneys 
owed 
8 of 23 
(34.8%)
6 of 23 
(26.1%)
8 of 23 
(34.8%) 
 
The use of carve-outs for trademark claims and claims for provisional 
relief―already among the most common types―increased somewhat over 
the period. By comparison, carve-outs for moneys owed and for real 
property claims decreased, at least to some extent, over the period. 
With the exception of the carve-outs for monies owed, all of these 
carve-outs involve contract provisions designed to protect the franchisor’s 
real property, intellectual property, or their rights to information, 
reputation, or innovation. The tradeoffs between litigation and arbitration 
here seem substantially similar to those found in the CEO employment 
contracts: arbitration can provide confidentiality to the parties, but when 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See supra note 116. 
 119. See supra note 116. 
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the underlying dispute threatens to destroy information or other property 
value for the company, the parties seem to prefer litigation.120 Unlike the 
CEO employment contracts, however, one additional motivation for the 
arbitration agreement is a desire to avoid class actions by franchisees.121 
Note that the franchise contract carve-outs all seem to give the franchisor, 
rather than the franchisees, rights to proceed with litigation.122 Like the 
CEO employment contracts, these contracts tend to be formed between two 
U.S. parties. Although the CEO employment contracts likely are heavily 
negotiated on both sides,123 often the franchise contracts are not mutually 
negotiated. This difference is somewhat apparent in the specific language 
used in the carve-out clauses, but it does not seem to significantly affect 
the types of carve-outs present in the agreements. 
This study also separated the contracts in the 2011 sample into 
categories by type of franchise business for separate analysis. Categories 
included food, hospitality, education, exercise, cleaning, tools and 
automotive, and others. Arbitration rates as well as carve-out rates for each 
of these categories are shown in Table 11. 
 






# (%) of arbitration 
clauses in contracts




Food 24 13 or 54% 13 or 100% 
Hospitality (Hotels) 8 0 ------------ 
Education 4 2 or 50% 2 or 100% 
Exercise 5 5 or 100% 5 or 100% 
Cleaning 8 4 or 50% 4 or 100% 
Tools/Automotive 10 7 or 70% 6 or 85.7% 
Other 27 12 or 44.4% 12 or 100% 
 
Note that the arbitration clause rate varied considerably (from 0% to 
100%), but where arbitration clauses were present, at least one remedy or 
form of dispute was reserved for court resolution in all contracts but one. 
Rates of specific type of carve-out for each industry are shown in Table 12. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 120. See supra Section II.A. 
 121. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 12, at 281–82. 
 122. Occasionally the contracts will include provisions that make this unilateral right to litigate 
more clear. For example, the Jiffy Lube franchise contract (on file with authors) empowers the 
franchisor to sue in court to collect monies owed, unless the franchisor counterclaims for breach of 
the franchise agreement, in which case the parties are to be sent back to arbitration. 
 123. See Thomas et al., supra note 74, at 960. 
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Table 12. Carve-Outs from Franchise Agreements, 2011–By Industry 
Type of 




Any carve-out 13 2 5 4 6 12 
Injunctive relief 
13 or 





















































Clause 0 0 0 
2 or 
50% 0 0 
 
The use of specific types of carve-outs from arbitration varies 
significantly by type of franchise. Because rights to information, 
innovation, and property are all best protected through injunctive relief, 
that carve-out alone might enable the franchisor to also protect its interest 
in the other categories. Differences in the other types of carve-outs 
therefore could reflect differences in the length of contracts or (in some 
cases) differences in the underlying contract. For example, if an agreement 
does not have a noncompete clause or confidentiality requirement, then 
there is no need to carve out supporting claims from arbitration. In the 
1999 sample, however, all of the franchise agreements with an arbitration 
clause but no carve-out for non-compete clause claims nonetheless 
included a covenant not to compete in 2012. Likewise, all of the franchise 
agreements with an arbitration clause but without a carve-out for 
confidentiality-clause claims nonetheless included a contract provision 
imposing a duty of confidentiality on the franchisee. Thus, the absence of a 
carve-out was not due to the absence of a contractual duty. 
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E.  Mobile Wireless Services Contracts 
Finally, for comparison purposes, the authors examined the use of 
carve-outs in one type of consumer contract. Mobile wireless services 
contracts have been at the center of recent litigation over the use of 
arbitration clauses and class waivers,124 but little work has been done to 
examine systematically the use of arbitration clauses (much less carve-
outs) in those contracts.125 
The market for mobile wireless services consists of facilities-based 
operators―operators that “offer mobile voice, messaging, and/or data 
services using their own network facilities”126―and mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNOs)―operators that “purchase[] mobile wireless services 
wholesale from facilities-based providers and resell[] the services to 
consumers.”127 Four facilities-based operators operate nationwide: AT&T, 
Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless.128 The rest operate 
regionally or locally.129 The largest MVNO is TracFone, which has more 
subscribers than all but the four nationwide facilities-based operators.130 
MVNOs may serve otherwise underserved market niches or provide 
extended services or geographic coverage for facilities-based operators.131 
In February and March 2013, the authors collected consumer 
agreements from the web pages of the twelve leading facilities-based 
operators (all those that operate nationally or regionally) and the two 
largest MVNOs (TracFone and H2O Wireless) for which subscriber data 
are available.132 Because facilities-based operators often include the 
customers of their wholesale customers (i.e., MVNOs) in their subscriber 
data,133 we report our findings for facilities-based operators separately from 
our findings for the MVNOs to avoid double-counting. 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Most notably, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 125. For exceptions, see Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 57 (2004) and Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in 
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 120 (2010). 
 126. In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, FCC Rcd. 11-103 (2011), at 30 [hereinafter Fifteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report]. 
 127. Id. at 35. 
 128. Id. at 7. 
 129. See id. at 31. 
 130. Id. at 36. 
 131. Id. at 35. 
 132. Market share data for the facilities-based operators is from Strategy Analytics. Grading 
the Top 10 U.S. Carriers in the Third Quarter of 2012, FIERCEWIRELESS (Nov. 26, 2012), 
http://www.fiercewireless.com/special-reports/grading-top-10-us-carriers-third-quarter-
2012. Market share data for the two MVNOs is from the FCC. Fifteenth Mobile Wireless 
Competition Report, supra note 126, at 262 tbl.C-6 (reporting 14.4 million subscribers for 
TracFone and more than 300,000 subscribers for H2O Wireless/Locus Telecommunications). 
 133. See Fifteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 126, at 37. 
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Agreements from eleven of the twelve facilities-based operators, 
covering 99.9% of subscribers, included arbitration clauses.134 Ten of the 
eleven contracts with arbitration clauses, covering 99.7% of subscribers 
subject to arbitration, carved out small claims from arbitration.135 The one 
contract without a small claims carve-out (which covered 0.3% of 
subscribers) included, instead, a carve-out for collection actions. The only 
other carve-outs were in contracts used by very small companies. One had 
a carve-out for intellectual property claims, while another had a carve-out 
for indemnity claims. 
                                                                                                                     
 134. In 2011, the FCC reported that the total number of facilities-based operators exceeded 
ninety, and that the companies “typically provide[d] service in a single geographical area, many of 
them rural areas.” Id. at 32. As of the first quarter of 2010, the total number of MVNOs ranged from 
forty-three to sixty-one, although little or no data were publicly available on the subscriber base of 
the MVNOs. Id. at 36–37. Information on the use of arbitration clauses for facilities-based 
operators or MVNOs is limited to those described above. Given that the largest mobile services 
providers use arbitration clauses, it is a fair statement that the substantial (if not vast) majority of 
their customers are subject to arbitration clauses. Given the lack of data for the smaller mobile 
services providers, it is not necessarily the case that most or all mobile services providers use 
arbitration clauses. Cf. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 
BYU L. REV. 1, 18 (finding that most credit card issuers do not use arbitration clauses). 
 135. Small claims carve-outs also are widely used in credit card agreements. See Rutledge & 
Drahozal, supra note 134, at 21–22. Rutledge and Drahozal describe the use of carve-outs in credit 
card agreements as follows: 
 Far and away the most common carve-out in credit card arbitration clauses is 
for small claims (defined either by the dollar amount sought or by the claims being 
brought in small claims court). Of the issuers studied, thirty-two (of forty-seven, or 
68.1%) excluded small claims from arbitration. Most of the agreements that did 
not exclude small claims were from small issuers (the fifteen issuers not including 
a small claims carve-out comprised only 1.6% of credit card loans outstanding, 
while the thirty-two including a small claims carve-out comprised 98.4% of credit 
card loans outstanding). 
 . . . . 
 Relatedly, five issuers (of forty-seven, or 10.6%; but 51.4% of credit card 
loans outstanding) excluded debt collection claims from arbitration. . . . 
 Other types of carve-outs are less common in credit card arbitration clauses. 
Nine issuers (of forty-seven, or 19.1%; 3.8% of credit card loans outstanding) 
excluded from arbitration claims for interim relief, such as preliminary injunctions 
and attachments. Twelve issuers (of forty-seven, or 25.5%; 11.2% of credit card 
loans outstanding) excluded repossession and other self-help remedies, while six 
issuers (of forty-seven, or 12.8%; 3.6% of credit card loans outstanding) excluded 
claims in bankruptcy. 
Id. at 21–23; see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results: Section 
1028(a) Study Results to Date 32–33 & tbl.4 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov 
/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf (presenting data on carve-outs for small 
claims). 
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Of the ten contracts with small claims carve-outs, four of ten (40.0%) 
covering 6.6% of subscribers applied to consumer small claims only. The 
remaining six (60.0%), which covered 93.4% of subscribers, carved out 
small claims brought by either consumers or the service providers. The 
carve-out for collection actions is very similar to a small claims carve-out 
for business claims only, to the extent the collection actions are brought in 
small claims court. 
 
Table 13. Carve-outs in Mobile Wireless Services Contracts
 # (%) of arbitration 
clauses 
with carve-outs % of subscribers 
Facilities-Based Operators  
Any carve-out 11 of 11 (100.0%) 100.0% 
Small claims 10 of 11 (90.9%) 99.7% 
Collection actions 1 of 11 (9.1%) 0.3% 
Mobile Virtual Network 
Operators (MVNOs) 
  
Any carve-out 2 of 2 (100.0%) 100.0% 
Small claims and/or 
collection actions 1 of 2 (50.0%) 2.0% 
Claims for unauthorized 
sale, export, or tampering 
with equipment 1 of 2 (50.0%) 98.0% 
 
By comparison, customer agreements from both MVNOs also included 
arbitration clauses. The TracFone agreement included a carve-out “for 
claims concerning the unauthorized sale, export, alteration and/or 
tampering of your TracFone, its software, the service and/or PIN 
numbers.”136 One version of the H2O Wireless agreement included a small 
claims carve-out for both the service provider and the customer,137 while 
the other included a small claims carve-out for the customer and a carve-
out for collection actions.138  
Both the American Arbitration Association (through its Consumer Due 
Process Protocol) and JAMS (through its Minimum Standards of 
Procedural Fairness) require businesses to permit consumers to go to small 
claims court in lieu of arbitration.139 As such, it is difficult to draw any 
                                                                                                                     
 136. TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC., TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE ¶ 23 (June 24, 2011) 
(copy on file with authors). 
 137. H2O WIRELESS, TERMS AND CONDITIONS (Feb. 2012) (copy on file with authors). 
 138. Id. 
 139. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 
OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, at Principle 5 (1998); JAMS POLICY 
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inferences about business or consumer behavior from the use of small 
claims carve-outs.140 On the other hand, the fact that a majority of contracts 
representing the vast majority of customers also provide the service 
provider with the right to proceed in court with small claims suggests a 
possible cost-cutting motivation. In any event, other carve-outs appear to 
be much less common in contracts with consumers than in contracts with 
other businesses. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis and empirical findings of this study suggest a number of 
possible implications for future scholarship and public policy related to 
both arbitration and courts. This Part discusses the implications of the 
analysis and findings for the following: (1) the contractual procedure 
scholarship; (2) the continuing role of courts in resolving business 
disputes; (3) the proper role of the unconscionability doctrine as applied to 
carve-outs from arbitration clauses; and (4) the application of severability 
doctrines in policing arbitration clauses more generally. 
A.  Procedural Unbundling and Contractual Procedure 
The rapidly growing literature on contractual procedure analyzes 
unbundled or à la carte procedures.141 Much of the literature has focused on 
the theoretical and normative implications of contracting for unbundled 
procedures. Some commentators have identified a range of benefits that 
sophisticated parties might obtain with unbundled procedure.142 Others 
have highlighted potential dangers of unbundling for the enforcement of 
legal norms and the legitimacy of the adjudication process.143 As Professor 
                                                                                                                     
ON CONSUMER ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS ¶ 1(B) (2009). 
 140. Moreover, the American Arbitration Association has reported that “few consumers 
exercise their right to have their matters heard in small claims court rather than in AAA consumer 
arbitration.” FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN 
DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 44 & n.211 (July 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-
consumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 142. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 17, at 1483–84 (arguing that “ex ante, [the parties] can 
gain substantial advantages from modified rules both before and after the dispute emerges,” such as 
“reduc[ing] strategic and opportunistic behavior and litigation costs should a dispute arise,” 
“shap[ing] the parties’ ex ante substantive and procedural behavior,” and “creating information 
revelation mechanisms”). 
 143. Bone, supra note 17, at 1397 (arguing that “party rule-making is most problematic when 
it alters procedures and rules designed to frame, guide, or incentivize” the core of the adjudicatory 
process: “a commitment to a mode of reasoning that engages general principle and case-specific 
facts in an effort to reach reflective equilibrium”); Dodge, supra note 17, at 729 (contending that 
contractual procedure “has the capacity to reshape not only the role of the private right of action 
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David Hoffman states, the “scholarship has generally proceeded to work 
out ever-more-sophisticated theoretical frameworks to govern the 
appropriate relationship between private and public procedural 
rulemaking.”144 
As noted above, however, the available empirical evidence suggests 
that detailed provisions customizing procedural rules are generally quite 
rare in contracts between sophisticated parties. In samples of corporate 
contracts and credit card agreements, Professor Hoffman found “literally 
only a handful of contracts . . . in which parties expect the court to impose 
their own procedural rules.”145 Moreover, even though one might expect a 
greater degree of procedural customization in arbitration clauses,146 
relatively little customization is found, at least in contracts between 
sophisticated parties.147 Thus, O’Hara O’Connor, Martin, and Thomas 
found that only a very small percentage of arbitration clauses in CEO 
employment contracts contained customized terms.148 To be sure, parties 
commonly chose an arbitral forum, an arbitration provider,149 and 
applicable, off-the-rack procedural rules promulgated by the provider, all 
of which have implications for the governing rules applied to their dispute 
resolution proceedings. However, they did almost nothing to change the 
procedural rules that would apply by default in these fora, the subject of 
much of the literature on customized procedure.150 For example, less than 
one percent of the contracts with arbitration clauses addressed the parties’ 
right to appeal the arbitrator’s decision to courts, only two percent 
addressed permitted testimony in the arbitration hearing, four percent 
provided time limits for demanding arbitration, and six percent addressed 
discovery.151  
Several reasons might explain this surprising rarity of ex ante à la carte 
procedures. First, individualized unbundling could interfere with 
                                                                                                                     
between contracting parties but also the broad swath of statutory, constitutional, and common law 
obligations that rely upon [procedure] as a primary mechanism of enforcement”). 
 144. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 393. 
 145. Id. at 429. 
 146. For example, given that the authority of arbitrators depends on the parties’ agreement, one 
might expect arbitrators to be more likely to apply contractually-specified procedures than judges. 
 147. By comparison, in standard form contracts between businesses and consumers, provisions 
modifying arbitral procedures are more common, although again the frequency varies widely 
depending on the type of contract. E.g., Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 134, at 21–49. Moreover, 
some franchise agreements also contain provisions customizing procedure as well as the sorts of 
carve-outs studied here. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 23, at 99–114. 
 148. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 166. 
 149. Of those choosing an arbitration provider, however, more than 90% of the contracts 
studied chose the AAA. Id. at 163. 
 150. Id. at 166. One might therefore think of this customization as the arbitration equivalent of 
a simple choice-of-court clause, where parties might choose a specific forum because in general 
they approve the procedures applied there by default. 
 151. Id. 
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cooperative mindsets because such efforts signal to the other party that one 
anticipates future disputes.152 Alternatively, unbundling may not occur 
because the lawyers drafting contracts are acting out of habit rather than 
pursuing optimization goals (or for other reasons contracts are “sticky”).153 
By one account, unbundling is a type of innovation, and innovation 
typically happens only through shocks to a system, which have not yet 
occurred.154 Under this explanation, the potential benefits of unbundling 
have not yet been fully realized by legal practitioners.  
A third possibility is that the individualized, ex ante procedural 
unbundling focused on in the literature could be prohibitively costly for 
most parties. Drafting costs could inhibit the parties, but adding a sentence 
or even a paragraph to a high-value contract should not prove preclusive. 
Instead, procedural customization could prove costly because of 
forecasting problems. Specifically, parties face a variety of different risks 
in their contractual relationships that could turn into disputes. 
Counterparties might not perform as they promise; they might perform, but 
in a negligent manner; they might cause a personal or financial injury to 
others in the course of performance; or they might perform perfectly, but 
steal a party’s personal property, intellectual property, or other proprietary 
information. These are just a few of the possible risks. 
If these risks materialize, they could lead to disputes involving many 
possible claims including breach of contract, negligence, trespass, 
conversion, actions for indemnity, misuse of intellectual property, etc. 
Given this diversity of possible risks and their accompanying legal claims, 
the optimal procedures for one potential dispute might well not prove 
optimal for others.155 Forecasting and then articulating the best possible 
procedures for each of these disputes could prove too costly, especially 
when the parties must agree that those procedures mutually benefit them. 
Support for this possibility can be found in the fact that procedural 
customization appears to be more common in the adhesion contract 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 122 
(2008); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 432 (1992). 
See generally Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 
119 (1995) (suggesting that mentioning dispute resolution procedures during contract negotiations 
can signal that a breach of contract claim is likely). 
 153. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 33–34 (2013).  
 154. Hoffman, supra note 20, at 425–28. 
 155. Others have noted this potential difficulty in the context of customized procedure, and 
also more generally. Moffitt, supra note 17, at 484 (“The transaction costs involved in the search 
for potential efficiency may, in certain contexts, outweigh the potential benefits that might derive 
from customization.”); see Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why 
Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2000) (stating that complex contracts will often 
be left incomplete because of the transactions costs of covering every contingency). 
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context,156 where the drafter can spread drafting costs across many 
contracts, and where the specific provisions need not be subject to 
individual bargaining. 
We think the third explanation, that contract customization is limited by 
forecasting costs, has more merit than the first two theories. If signaling or 
sticky-contracts-awaiting-system-shock theories explain the lack of 
procedural customization, then one should not expect any routine 
contractual customization of dispute resolution. In fact, however, as this 
Article has shown, carve-outs also provide a means by which parties 
contract for unbundled procedure, and carve-outs are common in at least 
some types of contracts between sophisticated parties. This form of 
customization enables the parties to customize according to particular 
performance risks, which appears to better enable the parties to capture 
performance incentives relative to specification costs.  
By unbundling potential claims and remedies, parties can then more 
effectively choose a default bundle of court procedures to treat some 
contractual risks while choosing a default bundle of arbitration procedures 
to treat others. This customization enables the parties to pick and choose 
the specific claims and remedies that are appropriately resolved in each 
venue. Moreover, by separating out some claims and remedies, this 
customization enables the parties to more carefully calibrate the fit 
between a chosen venue and the disputes it must handle. 
Despite the potential signaling effects of focusing on disputes, 
customization of claims and remedies does occur.157 Moreover, prior habits 
of binary choice or court default do not seem to constrain the parties from 
this type of customization. Instead, the parties unbundle claims and 
remedies because it enables them to separate out different types of contract 
risks for differing protection mechanisms. This type of tailoring is easier to 
forecast and cheaper to incorporate than the customization treated in the 
contractual procedure literature to date.158 Indeed, claim and remedy 
customization might make other types of contractual customization more 
feasible. This is because unbundling the differing risks makes it cheaper to 
customize the procedure that would apply for that specific category of risks 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See, e.g., Demaine & Hensler, supra note 125, at 64–72; Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter 
B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2011); Rutledge & Drahozal, 
supra note 134, at 37–50.  
 157. Although claim and remedy customization, through carve-outs (or carve-ins), could signal 
a different type of consideration than specific procedural rule customization, in both contexts the 
negotiations entail fine-tuning the procedures that will apply in a given setting. Indeed, carve-outs 
could be viewed with more suspicion by counterparties, because unlike the situation where a given 
set of customized procedural rules would apply to both parties’ claims, carve-outs often have the 
effect of causing one party’s claims to be treated differently than at least some of the other party’s 
claims. If signaling concerns do not work to defeat the negotiation of carve-outs, they are probably 
even less likely to work to defeat the negotiation of specific procedural rules. 
 158. See supra Sections I.B.–C. 
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depending on whether the claim is being handled in courts or arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the first cut at contractual customization should be, and 
apparently is, the unbundling of claims and remedies. 
Thus, procedural customization is an empirical reality, albeit not in the 
form most commonly believed. The scholarship should readjust its focus 
accordingly.159 More generally, this Article’s analysis suggests that the 
contractual procedure literature should focus more on the costs and 
benefits of customized procedure. Our model helps identify the following 
key costs and benefits: the performance incentives (or costs) to the parties; 
the increase or decrease in process costs from the customization; and the 
specification costs of drafting and negotiating a customized procedure. 
Particularly important for the latter appears to be the difficulty of 
anticipating the types of disputes and claims for which the parties might, ex 
ante, agree to more detailed procedures. 
B.  The Continued Necessity of Courts? 
Carve-outs also provide information on when sophisticated parties view 
courts as providing value. All types of contracts studied showed 
contracting parties regularly used both arbitration clauses and carve-outs 
from arbitration.160 This fact suggests that parties demand both arbitration 
and courts in a broad variety of contexts. Given that contractual 
relationships tend to involve multiple but differing performance risks, it is 
not surprising that parties might prefer to use courts to address some of 
those risks but arbitration to address others. The arbitration literature has 
identified some circumstances where parties might prefer courts to 
arbitration.161 For example, scholars have previously noted that parties 
often prefer courts to arbitration for “bet-the-company” cases and cases in 
which they may need to obtain provisional relief.162 Consistent with that 
literature, franchise contracts carve out trademark disputes (potentially a 
“bet-the-company” dispute for a franchisor, as well as one in which 
provisional relief might be required).163 Likewise, a common carve-out is 
for collection actions (or for moneys owed). In such actions the law and 
facts are likely to be relatively clear, and arbitration may do little more than 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 434 (“Obviously, the ability to choose arbitration for 
particular types of disputes should complicate our models of the background rule against which 
parties’ silence on procedural terms should be analyzed.”). 
 160. See supra Part II. 
 161. Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories of 
Private Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.163, 177–79 (2011); Drahozal & Ware, supra note 15, at 
453–57; Noyes, supra note 17, at 586–89, 591–92. 
 162. Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (1998); Drahozal & 
Wittrock, supra note 23, at 79; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 
14–15 n.83 (2009). 
 163. Drahozal, supra note 18, at 739; Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 23, at 79–80.  
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add another procedural step before a party can take the necessary legal 
steps to collect a debt.164  
But this study enables a broader consideration of the types of claims 
where parties are likely to consistently rely on courts for enforcement. 
Some argue that there are entire categories of commercial disputes that no 
longer get resolved in courts because private parties prefer arbitration.165 
However, even in situations where parties routinely refer matters to 
arbitration, the contracts we analyzed suggest that they nevertheless 
continue to prefer courts as a mechanism for protecting information, 
innovation, reputation, and property.166 If so, then courts should focus on 
providing the best possible substantive and procedural rules for the 
resolution of these types of disputes. That is the best way to provide value 
to private parties. This focus for court systems is nontrivial because the 
fraction of value in commercial exchange attributable to innovation and 
information is very significant (perhaps one half or more), and that fraction 
appears to be growing over time.167 
Consider, for example, court treatment of remedies available for breach 
of contract. One possible implication of the carve-out studies is that some 
parties conclude that courts can more efficiently and effectively resolve 
disputes involving requests for injunctive relief.168 Injunctive relief can 
take multiple forms, with some forms more valuable to parties attempting 
to protect information and innovation than others. Because injunctive relief 
is equitable, however, U.S. courts are not always willing to provide such 
relief if other remedies are available.169 This principle limits the granting of 
specific performance in lieu of monetary damages, and there is some 
evidence that this limitation is problematic for some contracting parties.  
Significant controversy surrounds the question of whether courts should 
be more willing to order specific performance. The traditional common 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Stephanie Francis Ward, They Dun Them Wrong, A.B.A. J., July 2008, at 16, 18 (“If the 
consumer is not going to pay the arbitration award, you have to take them to court anyway . . . .” 
(quoting Robert Markoff, President of the National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys)). 
 165. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771–72 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, 
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724 (2001). 
 166. For an expanded version of the argument in this Section, see Erin O’Hara O’Connor & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 167. See, e.g., Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the 
Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 281 (2004) 
(noting that IP assets alone account for 40% of U.S. corporate asset net value and over 33% of 
European company asset value). 
 168. Or, if arbitration is better at preserving the parties’ relationship, parties may be more 
willing to carve out types of disputes that are more likely to arise after that relationship is at an end. 
 169. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (4th ed. 
2010) (noting the general principle that “equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law”). 
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law rule is that courts will award specific performance only when damages 
would be inadequate,170 and, even then, not in the context of personal 
services.171 On the other hand, courts in civil law countries are less 
reluctant to order specific performance,172 and there is evidence that the 
traditional common law rule has eroded in at least some American 
courts.173 Scholars debate the policy merits of specific performance, with 
powerful arguments proffered on both sides.174 In the meantime, behavioral 
scholars have demonstrated that average Americans tend to think specific 
performance is an appropriate, even preferred, remedy for breach of 
contract.175  
In a number of contexts, sophisticated parties seem to prefer specific 
performance as the most effective means to protect the value of their 
exchange. A recent empirical study conducted by Eisenberg and Miller 
showed that contracting parties commonly incorporate into their 
documents language designed to enhance the likelihood of obtaining an 
order for specific performance in the event of breach.176 Specifically, their 
review of more than 2,300 contracts filed with the SEC in 2002 found that 
31.5% of all contracts attempted to provide for specific performance as a 
remedy, with such provisions found in 57.8% of employment contracts and 
53.4% of merger agreements.177 Interestingly, however, they found that 
parties were more, rather than less, likely to attempt to contract for specific 
performance when they opted for their disputes to be resolved in 
arbitration.178 Unfortunately, Eisenberg and Miller did not code for the 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 354 
(1978); Michael J. Sechler, Note, Supply Versus Demand for Efficient Legal Rules: Evidence from 
Early English “Contract” Law and the Rise of Assumpsit, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 161, 170 (2011) 
(noting the strict rules for granting specific performance in actions of assumpsit). 
 171. See, e.g., Jetborne Int’l, Inc. v. Cohan, 584 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981). 
 172. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance: 
Lessons from Commercial Contracts 15 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 13-09, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241654. 
 173. See id. at 16–17. 
 174. For examples of arguments in defense of the traditional rule, see Ian Ayres & Kristin 
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 
(1999); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1365 (1982); Timothy J. Muris, Comment, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 1053. For examples of arguments in favor of liberal granting of specific 
performance, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); 
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The 
Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 341 (1984). 
 175. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 412, 420 (2009). 
 176. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 172, at 5–6. 
 177. Id. at 35 tbl.3. 
 178. Id. at 38 & tbl.7. 
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presence of carve-outs in the arbitration clauses.179 Parties seeking specific 
performance as a remedy for some claims might in fact designate courts for 
the resolution of those claims by placing carve-outs in their arbitration 
clauses. Alternatively, parties seeking specific performance might opt for 
arbitration rather than courts out of fear that courts are less likely than 
arbitrators to grant specific performance. If the latter explains the clauses, 
then courts might better serve party needs by announcing a clear 
willingness to order specific performance when parties contract for the 
remedy.180 And, in any event, the Eisenberg and Miller findings help show 
the importance of accounting for contractual carve-outs. 
Some scholars have noted a difference between common law and civil 
law countries regarding court ability and willingness to grant equitable 
relief more generally, as well as court willingness to exercise contempt 
powers.181 In civil law countries, where courts are not thought to have any 
inherent equitable powers, such authority must be granted by statute and 
may therefore be weaker.182 And even with an ability to coerce parties to 
comply with court orders, judges in countries where contempt authority is 
the exception rather than the rule may be relatively less willing than judges 
in the United States to use conferred contempt powers. Given the types of 
claims that U.S. parties are carving out from arbitration, the availability of 
equitable relief seems to create significant value for private parties. 
A remaining question, which is too broad to adequately address here, is 
whether legal reforms should include the creation of specialized courts to 
handle claims involving information and innovation. Relatedly, states 
could experiment with lodging these claims in their business courts, which 
should have jurisdiction over most business contract disputes in any 
event.183 Specialized courts might better serve party needs than courts of 
                                                                                                                     
 179. O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 166 (manuscript at 21). 
 180. To be clear, however, the use of carve-outs does not provide evidence that parties prefer 
juries to arbitration, a possibility suggested by Eisenberg and Miller. See Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver 
Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539, 587 (2007). The most 
common types of claims that parties carve out of arbitration clauses either involve injunctive relief 
(including injunctions to enforce trademarks, covenants not to compete, and confidentiality 
agreements) or the use of specialized court procedures (collection actions and eviction actions), in 
none of which is a jury likely to play a role. This Article does not argue that juries never provide 
value to sophisticated parties in resolving their disputes. But it finds little evidence of such value in 
the provisions studied here. 
 181. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 118 
(1991); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 49, 55 (2d ed. 1985). 
 182. See, e.g., Robert S. Barker, Judicial Review in Costa Rica: Evolution and Recent 
Developments, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 267, 275 (2000). 
 183. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 495–96 (2009) (discussing common jurisdictional grants in business court 
statutes). 
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general jurisdiction because the parties can more effectively rely on expert 
decision makers and potentially streamlined proceedings. Inevitably, such 
determinations would critically involve matters outside the scope of this 
Article’s analysis, but this study does have implications for court reforms. 
Of course, our analysis implicitly assumes both that social welfare is 
equivalent to private welfare in these contexts and that courts might ever 
be motivated to promote either private or social welfare. As to the first 
point, if sophisticated parties transact in a market context without 
significant third-party effects, then private and social welfare should 
converge. Where parties are unsophisticated or where third parties are hurt 
by party efforts to protect information and innovation, then this Article’s 
analysis begins, rather than ends, the court reform discussion. As for the 
motivation of courts, U.S. courts considering reforms at least sometimes 
account for both efficient dispute resolution and party preferences.184 
Where those motivations are present, the findings reported here can 
provide helpful insights. 
Finally, our findings have implications for the literature on economic 
development. Many scholars have noted the importance of strong courts 
and legal systems as factors that impact a nation’s ability to attract 
investment opportunities.185 Some scholars argue that a state’s legal rules 
must protect private arrangements, through property and contract rights,186 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, the Law Market, and the 
Law of Lawyering 14 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 13-33, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2349674 (discussing this dynamic in the context of the 
creation of business courts within the United States). 
 185. See, e.g., Charles W. Cookson II, Long-Term Direct Investment in Brazil, 35 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 345, 358 (2004) (noting importance of effective legal system for a nation’s 
ability to attract foreign direct investment); Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 340 
(2007) (noting that “while investment treaty arbitration may not directly trigger investment, the 
availability of this dispute resolution mechanism is a factor in an overall decisional matrix”); Rumu 
Sarkar, The Legal Implications of Financial Sector Reform in Emerging Capital Markets, 13 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 705, 721–22 (1998) (“The ‘menu’ of expectations that a foreign investor has in 
evaluating investment opportunities in a particular developing country is quite predictable. The 
criteria include . . . a legal system that provides adequate redress for conflicts or disputes.”); David 
Hindman, Note, The Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on Foreign Investments in Developing 
Economies, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 473 (2006) (“The attraction of sizable capital 
investment necessary for economic growth requires confidence that there will be predictable 
answers to key legal questions and that business disputes will be resolved promptly and fairly.”); 
David F. Clossey & Jere R. Thomson, A Global Law Firm Operating in a Global Market: Jones 
Day, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2004, at 9, available at 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/May/09.pdf (“All in all, not only Russian 
counterparties, but also the Russian government, are recognizing the importance of the rule of law 
in attracting foreign investment.”). 
 186. See, e.g., Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of 
the World Bank, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROCEEDINGS OF A 
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 219, 220 (Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., 1995). 
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and that those rules must be considered stable, through the development of 
stare decisis,187 long-term commitments to international investment 
treaties,188 or otherwise. In addition, the judiciary must be independent of 
the other branches of government189 and sufficiently well funded to attract 
high quality judges who can expeditiously resolve disputes.190  
However, not all agree that this judicial investment is entirely essential. 
For example, Professor Tom Ginsburg has noted that third-party dispute 
resolution can facilitate investment by “substitut[ing] for poor institutional 
environments.”191 Other scholars have argued that nations can bypass 
decades of court and law reform efforts if they can credibly commit to 
enforcing arbitration clauses and arbitrator awards.192 The fact that more 
than 145 nations have signed the New York Convention,193 which 
obligates states to enforce arbitration clauses and arbitral awards,194 
supports this emphasis on private arbitration as a substitute for ineffective 
domestic courts and legal systems. Given common scholarly claims that 
the vast majority of parties to international contracts prefer to arbitrate 
disputes,195 it seems possible that at least international investment can 
easily thrive without strong courts.196 
                                                                                                                     
 187. See Cookson, supra note 185, at 351–52. 
 188. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its 
Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115, 115–16 (2003). 
 189. See Shihata, supra note 186, at 220. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 107, 113 (2005). 
 192. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 98 (2009). 
 193. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 194. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1 & art. 3. For a list of current member countries, see Status: Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last 
visited June 24, 2014). 
 195. KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993) (noting 
that about 90% of international economic contracts have an arbitration clause); Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark, Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 57, 59 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. 
Naimark eds., 2005) (discussing research finding that almost 90 percent of sample of international 
joint venture agreements contained arbitration clauses); Alessandra Casella, On Market Integration 
and the Development of Institutions: The Case of International Commercial Arbitration, 40 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 155, 156 (1996); Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International 
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1337, 1339–40 (2007); Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Award: 
Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 868 (1996); 
William Wang, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1059, 1060 (2003); Robert K. Wrede, Honolulu: Geneva of the Pacific?, 7 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 189, 193–95 (2007). 
 196. This Article sets aside the question of the desirability of arbitration for enforcement of 
bilateral investment treaties on grounds that neither its data nor its theory can effectively address the 
topic. 
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This Article’s findings suggest that parties who mistrust local courts 
will instead resolve their disputes via arbitration. But the findings also 
suggest that contractual value is lost if parties cannot rely on courts to 
protect the value of their information and innovation. Recall that parties 
seemed to opt for court resolution of some claims in part to avoid having to 
shuffle back and forth between courts and arbitration when the claim is 
best enforced with injunctive relief. Although the problem could be 
resolved by empowering the arbitrator to grant such relief,197 arbitrator 
authority would not extend to third parties,198 and arbitrators would 
inevitably lack the muscle of the state in the event of violation (i.e. 
contempt powers). Moreover, even if arbitrators could effectively grant 
preliminary relief, the problems associated with third-party rights and 
responsibilities, bet-the-company claims, and a need for clear law and 
potential precedent (i.e., patent validity) could still weigh decidedly in 
favor of court resolution of the claim. 
Especially if today’s high-technology trade and development is 
particularly valuable to a nation,199 a credible commitment to allow parties 
to privatize their dispute resolution will not suffice to attract maximum 
investment opportunities. Strong, effective courts are also needed. Other 
nations’ courts might at least partially substitute for local courts. Thus, a 
policy in favor of enforcing choice-of-court clauses could also aid 
economic behavior. To the extent that a party’s assets or conduct are local, 
however, local courts that can reliably grant equitable relief based on a 
sound legal system may remain essential to preserving the value of private 
contracts.200 
China seems to recognize the need for providing effective courts for the 
resolution of intellectual property claims. Recall that the technology 
contracts between Chinese firms (many of whom claimed foreign 
ownership interests in the contract) opted for arbitration without any use of 
carve-outs at comparatively very high rates. Recently, the Chinese 
government has invested significant assets to develop specialized 
                                                                                                                     
 197. The AAA has standing panels that can provide emergency relief to a party, including a 
preliminary injunction, but the parties must contract for the right to seek such relief, and few parties 
appear to use these panels. 
 198. This might matter, for example, in the context of noncompete clauses, where a former 
employer seeks to enjoin a new employer from taking advantage of the information and talents of 
the employee. 
 199. This is presumably true for most nations. See, e.g., Hindman, supra note 185, at 469–72 
(noting the importance of high-tech investments to all nations and competition for such foreign 
direct investment across nations); Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property in the Western 
Hemisphere, 28 U. MIAMI INTER.-AM. L. REV. 565, 576–77 (1997) (discussing a study finding that 
IP protection in a nation has a statistically significant effect on foreign direct investment into the 
country “toward the creation and development of new technology”). 
 200. See, e.g., Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 362 (Ark. 
2000) (denying appellant’s motion to arbitrate claims arising from a consumer loan agreement with 
carve-out for the business but not the consumer for collection claims). 
54
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/3
2014] UNBUNDLING PROCEDURE 1999 
 
intellectual property courts, despite the availability of arbitration 
administered by the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC).201 In particular, to date the government has set up 
about 400 intellectual property tribunals and panels across China.202 
However, China’s struggles continue, due in large part to the extremely 
uneven distribution of IP cases to the new tribunals and panels.203 The busy 
courts have such congested dockets that they cut corners in deciding 
cases,204 while courts with very few cases are failing to provide an 
environment where novice judges can master the field.205 It will likely take 
a while to resolve these difficulties, and even longer before parties feel 
confident returning to the courts. But this very significant investment 
represents an acknowledgement by the Chinese government that arbitration 
alone will not satisfy commercial parties’ demands. 
Evidence of high rates of carve-outs, even in cross-border contracts, 
suggests that private parties would value international agreement under the 
Hague Choice-of-Court Convention. The Convention,206 concluded in 
2005, would obligate member nations to honor choice-of-court agreements 
and enforce judgments rendered in courts chosen pursuant to party 
agreement.207 Currently, the United States is not a party to any international 
agreements that obligate courts to enforce court judgments rendered in 
other countries. Thus, parties choosing courts to resolve disputes in cross-
border contracts risk not having that award enforced elsewhere. In contrast, 
the New York Convention obligates most nations to enforce arbitration 
awards rendered in other countries. To date, only Mexico has ratified the 
Hague Convention, although the United States and the European Union 
have both signed, but not yet ratified, it.208 The Hague Convention 
promises to secure cross-border enforcement of court judgments for 
commercial parties, which could prove particularly valuable to parties who 
wish to use carve-outs for some potential claims.209 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: 
Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1101 (1996). 
 202. Zhang Guangliang, Discussion on IP Judicial Institution, Judges, and Ways to Hear IP 
Cases, PERSP.: CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS, 2011, at 80, 81. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 82. 
 205. See id. at 81. 
 206. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98. 
 207. Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy 
and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 546 (2005). 
 208. See Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited June 24, 2014). 
 209. A caveat is in order here. We saw little evidence of contracting parties incorporating 
choice-of-court clauses into their carve-outs. This could be because parties contemplating a need for 
injunctive relief want to be able to obtain that relief wherever a contractual violation occurs. 
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C.  Court Scrutiny of Carve-Outs 
A number of U.S. state courts—most notably in California and 
Arkansas—consistently invalidate arbitration clauses that carve out certain 
types of disputes. California courts hold that arbitration clauses with carve-
outs contained in employment contracts are unconscionable unless the 
drafting party (i.e., the business) can demonstrate a business reason for the 
carve-out.210 Moreover, based on this principle, California courts have 
invalidated even those arbitration clauses found in CEO and other 
executive employment agreements,211 and have never deemed a proffered 
business justification sufficient to save the arbitration clause.212 Arkansas 
courts require mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate and do not accept any 
justification for a carve-out that benefits the business over an employee or 
consumer.213 
This Article’s findings cast doubt on both of these lines of cases.214 
Carve-outs are not outlier provisions that shock the conscience. To the 
contrary, freely negotiated contracts―i.e., contracts between two 
sophisticated parties―regularly use carve-outs from arbitration clauses.215 
Moreover, courts should not automatically conclude that carve-outs found 
in employment contracts necessarily indicate overreaching by the 
employer. Indeed, CEO employment contracts involve very sophisticated 
employees who typically negotiate their agreements with the assistance of 
counsel.216 Yet these contracts commonly use the very sorts of carve-outs 
that courts have held unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. As such, 
this analysis suggests that the seemingly unrebuttable presumption that 
such carve-outs are unfair to consumers or employees is unwarranted.  
                                                                                                                     
Presumably some parties feel comfortable designating a court in some circumstances, if only as a 
permissive matter, so the Convention should nevertheless prove useful for parties relying on carve-
outs. 
 210. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000); 
Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 211. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 20, at 156–57. 
 212. Id. at 155; see, e.g., Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 
996, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The only business justification offered by Fastbucks for the non-mutual 
judicial remedy provision was its need to seek provisional remedies, which is insufficient under 
California law to justify non-mutuality . . . .”); Fitz, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105 (“NCR’s concern that 
arbitration may not always meet its legitimate dispute resolution needs is not a proper business 
justification for the exception.”); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677–78 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting asserted business justification for carve-out of claims for injunctive 
relief). 
 213. Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 366–67 (Ark. 2000). 
 214. Conversely, this Article’s analysis supports, on a policy basis, the outcome in THI of New 
Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC v. Patton, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA preempts 
New Mexico’s application of unconscionability doctrine to invalidate arbitration clauses with carve-
outs. 741 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 215. See supra Part II. 
 216. Thomas et al., supra note 74, at 960.  
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Likewise, the findings belie California’s requirement that the business 
reason justifying a carve-out be something other than the fact that 
arbitration is not well suited for resolving a particular type of dispute.217 
Even in contracts between sophisticated parties, that is precisely the reason 
parties use carve-outs. Moreover, given that these carve-outs are common 
across many different types of contracts where relative bargaining power 
and contract-drafting practices likely differ, they are unlikely to simply 
result from particular lawyer preferences or the dominant influence of one 
of the parties. No doubt, further study of carve-outs is needed before 
reaching any firm conclusions, but one can at least tentatively conclude 
that the business justification is one of significant value to the contract.218 
Specifically, even where the clause tends to benefit just one of the parties, 
as is the case for the CEO employment contracts, the party not benefitted 
by the clause, if sophisticated, agrees to its inclusion, perhaps for a price. If 
so, this suggests that the benefit to the party proposing the term is worth 
more than the cost to the other party of accepting it. In effect, the 
California requirement sets a standard that no business can satisfy in good 
faith.219 
                                                                                                                     
 217. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 
2000) (stating that a reasonable business justification must be “grounded in something other than 
the employer's desire to maximize its advantage based on the perceived superiority of the judicial 
forum”). 
 218. One might think that in some contracting contexts the terms of the agreement primarily 
are a function of the preferences of the party that presents the terms of the initial contract draft. For 
example, if the buyer in an M&A deal tends to present the terms of a first draft, and the seller can 
only focus on some of those terms in the negotiations, then many of the buyer’s terms will never be 
challenged, even if they do not mutually benefit the parties. Cf. Christel Karsten & Zacharias 
Sautner, What Drives the Variation in Takeover Contracts: The Economics or the Lawyers? (Mar. 
16, 2013) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2081805 (empirical study showing 
that terms of takeover contracts are in part a function of economic circumstance and in part a 
function of the drafting practices of particular law firms). Such systemic concerns clearly affect our 
franchise contracts, but we have no reason to believe that the technology contracts, the joint venture 
agreements, or the CEO employment contracts analyzed were similarly affected. 
 219. Even assuming there is no business reason that justifies the use of a carve-out, the state 
law restrictions on their use may make consumers and employees worse off rather than better off. 
Drahozal has shown previously that a requirement of mutuality may lead businesses to use mutual 
dispute resolution clauses when a non-mutual clause would make the consumer or employee better 
off. Drahozal, supra note 21, at 555–61. 
The use of class waivers in arbitration clauses has analogous implications. Businesses may use 
an arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver to reduce if not avoid class relief altogether. But 
avoiding class actions in that way involves more than simply waiving class relief. It also brings with 
it the other characteristics of the arbitration procedural bundle, which the parties may or may not 
otherwise prefer. (This point is consistent with the argument in Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. 
Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Analysis, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 536, 566 (2012), that not all businesses are likely to begin using arbitration clauses 
after AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.) As such, the use of arbitration clauses as class action 
waivers may impose costs on the parties entirely separate from any costs (or benefits) of the 
elimination of class relief. The use of carve-outs may mitigate those costs by permitting parties to 
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The issue of the enforceability of such carve-outs has also plagued the 
courts of other nations. Some nations’ courts, including those in England 
and Hong Kong, have expressed a willingness to enforce jurisdictional 
clauses even when they provide asymmetric rights to one party over the 
other to use courts or arbitration.220 Others, however, have struck down 
such provisions as unfairly unequal.221 This Article’s analysis suggests that 
a categorical exclusion of forum provisions that provide unequal rights 
sweeps too broadly. 
Consider, for example, a recent case decided in the Russian courts. In 
CJSC Russian Telephone Co. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications 
Rus LLC, two companies agreed to arbitrate their claims, but the service 
provider reserved a right to bring claims to court based on monies owed to 
it by the other party. The court struck the clause as unfairly unequal, even 
though the case involved sophisticated parties who had chosen to resolve a 
particular claim in courts rather than in arbitration.222 As indicated earlier, 
however, sound business practice can justify the clause; it does not 
necessarily originate from overreaching by a party. Thus, as with 
unconscionability in U.S. courts, a more nuanced analysis of similar 
foreign-law doctrines such as “mutuality” and “inequality” seems 
warranted.223 
D.  Severability Doctrines 
This Article’s findings also have implications for how courts apply 
severability doctrines. When a court decides it cannot refer a particular 
matter to arbitration, at least as contemplated by the contract, the court can 
                                                                                                                     
obtain the court bundle of procedures for some claims or remedies, but not if state law effectively 
invalidates the use of such carve-outs. 
 220. See, e.g., Mauritius Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Hestia Holdings Ltd., [2013] EWHC 
(Comm) 1328 [42] (U.K.); China Merchs. Heavy Indus. Co. v. JGC Corp., [2001] H.K.L.R.D. 21 
(C.A.) (H.K.). 
 221. Russian Tel. Co. CJSC v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns Rus LLC, Case No. 1831/12 
(June 19, 2012), available at http://www.arbitrations.ru/userfiles/file/Case%20Law/
Enforcement/Sony_Ericsson_Russian_Telephone_Company_Supreme_Court%20eng.pdf (ruling a 
contractual provision invalid because it gave Sony a unilateral right to bring monies owed claims to 
court even though all other claims by the parties were to be resolved in arbitration); see also Cour 
de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1e civ., Sept. 26, 2012, Bull. civ. I No. 11-
26022 (Fr.) (ruling a clause in a bank account agreement invalid because it forced the consumer to 
arbitrate in the courts of Luxembourg but giving the bank the option to choose a different court). 
 222. For a recent discussion of this and related cases, see Maxi Scherer & Sophia Lange, The 
French Rothschild Case: A Threat for Unilateral Dispute Resolution Clauses?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG 
(July 18, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/07/18/the-french-rothschild-case-a-
threat-for-unilateral-dispute-resolution-clauses/. 
 223. It could be that unbundling claims could have troublesome third-party effects by, for 
example, making it less costly for parties to seek arbitration in order to keep some disputes private. 
The claim here is not that carve-outs are per se desirable; rather, they are not per se undesirable as a 
policy matter. 
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either strike the entire arbitration clause or remove the offending portion 
from the scope of the clause. Our findings caution against striking the 
entire arbitration clause in circumstances where the problem can be 
resolved by severing individual claims, subject of course to the possible 
differences resulting from the settings in which courts are considering 
severability. This Section discusses severability as it arises under the 
unconscionability doctrine and federal statutes addressing nonarbitrability. 
1.  Unconscionability 
When a court finds that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, it 
has discretion to either strike the entire agreement or modify it to excise the 
offending portion. Courts typically consider whether the unconscionability 
infects the entire clause or just a portion of it. For example, when courts 
deem arbitration clauses to be unconscionable because they contain carve-
outs, they often conclude that the carve-outs create nonmutual obligations 
that infect the entire arbitration agreement. As a result, instead of striking 
the carve-out, courts strike the entire arbitration agreement, which typically 
enables the employee or consumer to proceed with the case in court. 
In some cases, an arbitration clause contains multiple problems that 
lead a court to strike the entire clause. In other cases, however, the 
difficulty is more isolated. Even in those cases, though, the entire 
arbitration clause sometimes is in jeopardy. A court will not strike or 
rewrite a portion of the arbitration agreement if the clause, as modified by 
the court, produces results that never would have garnered the parties’ 
assent. Sometimes a court will strike an entire arbitration clause simply 
because it wishes to avoid the problem of rewriting the parties’ agreement. 
The findings reported here suggest that courts should be less hesitant to 
modify, rather than invalidate, an arbitration clause when the modification 
removes particular claims from the scope of the arbitration agreement. The 
analysis indicates that parties commonly carve-out claims from arbitration 
when those claims seem ill-suited for arbitration and the specification costs 
are sufficiently small. Thus, modification by courts on similar grounds 
might not interfere with the assent required for the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses.224 
2.  Statutory Nonarbitrability Provisions 
Consider, also, the structure of statutes that make specified claims 
nonarbitrable—that is, statutes that preclude arbitration of a statutory claim 
under a pre-dispute arbitration clause. For example, in the Dodd-Frank 
                                                                                                                     
 224. By comparison, invalidating the entire clause puts the parties in the position of attempting 
to renegotiate post-dispute an agreement entered into pre-dispute (i.e., when there was uncertainty 
over whether a dispute would ever arise). As discussed earlier, see supra note 18, the parties might 
come to a different agreement (or no agreement at all) after a dispute has arisen than they would 
have beforehand. 
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress enacted a 
series of such provisions that preclude arbitration of whistleblower claims 
by employees of consumer financial services firms, commodities firms, 
and publicly-traded firms.225 The provisions are similar in that they limit 
arbitration under pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the claims at issue 
protect whistleblowers. But they differ in the scope of their effect. Two of 
the provisions invalidate the entire arbitration clause. These provisions 
state that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable “if the [arbitration 
clause] requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”226 The 
other provision does not invalidate the entire arbitration clause. It only 
carves out the statutory claim from arbitration. This provision states that 
the arbitration agreement is unenforceable “to the extent that it requires 
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”227 
A similar issue has arisen as to claims under the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act (MMWA). The MMWA permits a warrantor of consumer 
goods to establish a nonbinding dispute resolution process, but does not 
expressly preclude the use of a binding arbitration clause. Most courts have 
held that claims under the MMWA are arbitrable.228 But of the courts that 
have held MMWA claims not arbitrable, some invalidate the entire 
arbitration clause,229 while others only carve out the MMWA claim from 
arbitration.230 
By comparison, the Supreme Court has flatly held that a court must 
compel arbitration of pendent state-law claims, even when the court will be 
adjudicating a nonarbitrable federal statutory claim.231 In other words, 
when Congress does not address the issue, a nonarbitrable claim 
invalidates the arbitration agreement only to the extent the agreement 
provides for arbitration of the claim. The Court in Byrd rejected the 
“intertwining” doctrine under which some courts, in the interests of 
                                                                                                                     
 225. 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or 
enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); 12 
U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2) (2012) (“[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable to 
the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) 
(2012) (“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement 
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”). 
 226. 7 U.S.C. § 26(n) (emphasis added) (commodities whistleblowers); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) 
(emphasis added) (whistleblowers in publicly traded companies). 
 227. 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2) (emphasis added) (whistleblowers in consumer financial services 
industry). 
 228. See, e.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton 
v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Am. Homestar, Inc., 50 
S.W.3d 480, 492 (Tex. 2001).  
 229. See, e.g., Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529, 534 (Miss. 2002). 
 230. See, e.g., Koons Ford, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 736–37 (Md. 2007). 
 231. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223–24 (1985). 
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efficiency, had refused to send the pendent claims to arbitration when they 
were “intertwined” with the nonarbitrable claims.232 The Court explained: 
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the 
conflict between two goals of the Arbitration 
Act―enforcement of private agreements and encouragement 
of efficient and speedy dispute resolution―must be resolved 
in favor of the latter in order to realize the intent of the 
drafters [of the FAA]. The preeminent concern of Congress in 
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which 
parties had entered, and that concern requires that we 
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 
“piecemeal” litigation, at least absent a countervailing policy 
manifested in another federal statute.233 
The Court also rejected the argument that the possible preclusive effect 
of the arbitral proceedings (another form of bifurcation cost234) justified the 
intertwining doctrine: 
[I]t is far from certain that arbitration proceedings will 
have any preclusive effect on the litigation of nonarbitrable 
federal claims. . . .  
. . . . 
The question of what preclusive effect, if any, the 
arbitration proceedings might have is not yet before us, 
however, and we do not [yet] decide it . . . . Suffice it to say 
that in framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall 
take into account the federal interests warranting protection. 
As a result, there is no reason to require that district courts 
decline to compel arbitration, or manipulate the ordering of 
the resulting bifurcated proceedings, simply to avoid an 
infringement of federal interests.235 
Our findings support the Court's decision in Byrd, and suggest that, if 
Congress desires to make a particular statutory claim nonarbitrable, it 
should invalidate an arbitration clause only to the extent that it covers the 
nonarbitrable claim. Sophisticated parties commonly are willing to bear the 
costs of cases bifurcated between court and arbitration to obtain the 
relative advantages of those two forums. As the Court concludes in Byrd, 
enforcing the parties’ arbitration agreement should take precedence over 
concerns about “piecemeal” litigation, especially when parties themselves 
contract for bifurcation. Congress likewise should take this empirical 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Id. at 216, 219 (describing intertwining doctrine as based on the view that the FAA’s 
“goal of speedy and efficient decision-making is thwarted by bifurcated proceedings”). 
 233. Id. at 221. 
 234. See supra notes 51–52.  
 235. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222–23. 
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reality into account when formulating statutory nonarbitrability provisions. 
If the parties view the costs of bifurcation as excessive, they can address 
the issue in their arbitration clause. 
CONCLUSION 
Procedural unbundling is alive and well, but not in the forms typically 
assumed by scholars. In a wide variety of contracts, parties routinely 
unbundle the procedures governing their anticipated disputes, deciding to 
pursue some claims and remedies in court and others in arbitration. By 
unbundling claims and remedies in this manner, parties can obtain greater 
performance incentives and lower dispute resolution costs without facing 
the prospect of prohibitively expensive specification costs. These latter 
costs are minimized, relative to the alternative of individually unbundling 
procedures to be applied to all possible claims, because carve-outs and 
carve-ins enable parties to separate governing procedures based on the 
nature of the specific risks of nonperformance. For most parties, less 
perfectly crafted off-the rack rules applied on the basis of carefully tailored 
claims appear preferable to more carefully tailored procedural rules that 
must then apply to all possible disputes. 
The prevalence of unbundling by carve-outs in contracts involving 
sophisticated parties has policy implications for courts’ treatment of 
unconscionability and nonarbitrability questions that arise in the context of 
enforcing arbitration clauses. It also suggests that governments wishing to 
ensure that local courts provide value to commercial parties should focus 
on the substantive rules and procedures applied to claims that function to 
protect information, innovation, reputation, and property. 
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